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Abstract 
This paper explores a question of superficial triviality: when sports use 
instant replay technology to review on-field calls, what standard of review should 
they employ?  The conventional view is that on-field calls should be entrenched 
against reversal such that, if the reviewing official has any doubt about the 
correctness of the initial call, he must let it stand even if he thinks it very probably 
wrong.  Indeed, in the wake of officiating debacles at last summer‟s FIFA World 
Cup, commentators proposed not only that soccer employ instant replay, but also 
that it follow the NFL in directing officials to overturn on-field calls only when 
“indisputable visual evidence” (IVE) reveals that call to be mistaken.  This essay 
argues that common wisdom in favor of IVE overlooks important considerations 
against entrenchment and likely rests upon mistaken premises, and it offers 
several concrete proposals for reform. 
A lengthy investigation into the optimal standard of review for instant 
replay in sports might seem frivolous.  But it serves a deeper ambition.  We are in 
the early years of sports‟ colonization by econometricians, as legal theorists 
remain watching from the sidelines.  That is unfortunate.  Formal organized 
sports are, in effect, legal systems, and legal theorists might find much both to 
teach and to learn by paying closer attention to competitive athletics.  In short, 
legal theorists would benefit from a sustained engagement with what I have 
termed, in previous work, “the jurisprudence of sport.” 
As a case study in this nascent field, this essay reveals that the problem of 
appellate review in sports is surprisingly rich and complex—implicating profound 
questions concerning the relationships among desert, entitlement and justice; the 
difference between mistake and error; and the contours of loss aversion and 
omission bias, among other things.  But it shows even more than that.  The 
jurisprudence of sport maintains that sporting practices and norms can teach 
lessons for ordinary legal systems as surely as the other way around.  Illustrating 
that claim, this essay draws from football replay practices an argument to reform 
the criminal trial system to accommodate two verdicts of acquittal, not one. 
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INTRODUCTION 
By most accounts, the 2010 FIFA World Cup was a brilliant success for 
the host nation.  Ever since soccer‟s world governing body had awarded the 2010 
tournament to South Africa, making it the first African nation to host the world‟s 
largest sporting event, critics had worried that it would not be up to the task.  As 
late as 2006, influential soccer figures had talked openly about withdrawing the 
tournament from South Africa over concerns that the stadiums would be 
incomplete or substandard and that crime and violence would run unchecked.
1
  In 
the event, those fears went unrealized.  Praising the quality of the facilities, the 
vigilance of the government, and the warmth of the people, FIFA President Sepp 
Blatter gave South Africa a grade of 9 out of 10, or “summa cum laude.”
2
 
If South Africans had reason to be proud of their accomplishments, fans 
across the globe gave the five-week tournament decidedly low marks.  One 
common complaint focused on the vuvuzelas, a South African horn blown by fans 
that reaches an ear-splitting 127 decibels and whose drone has been compared to 
the mind-wracking buzzing of millions of angry bees.  Even worse, though, was 
the officiating, which fans and journalists around the world derided as “an 
absolute joke.”
3
  
Fans of the American squad best remember referee Koman Coulibaly‟s 
never-explained disallowance of what likely would have been the Yanks‟ game-
winning goal against Serbia off a direct kick by Landon Donovan.  But the 
knockout round witnessed even bigger howlers.  England, for example, was 
denied an equalizer against Germany when referee Jorge Larrionda failed to see 
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that a shot by Frank Lampard that hit the underside of the crossbar landed a full 
two feet inside the goal.  And Argentina took a 1-0 lead against Mexico on a goal 
by Carlos Tevez scored after Tevez had been at least a yard offside.   
Gross officiating errors like these—following on the heels of a gaffe 
during qualifiers that allowed France to make it to South Africa on a blatant but 
uncalled Thierry Henry handball—provoked worldwide calls for soccer to initiate 
some form of replay.  Public opinion on the question was so strong that even 
Blatter, who, only two years earlier, had refused even to consider proposals to 
employ technology to improve or review on-field officiating, felt compelled to 
change his tune.  After having apologized to England and Mexican officials for 
the gross miscues in their matches, Blatter acknowledged that “we have to open 
again this file, definitely.”  “Something,” he conceded, “has to be changed.”
4
 
Remarkably, just a week before opening ceremonies in Johannesburg, 
Major League Baseball had been hit with an instant replay controversy of its own 
when umpire Jim Joyce robbed Detroit Tigers hurler Armanda Galarraga of a 
perfect game with a mistaken call at first base with two outs in the ninth inning.  
The popular response was enormous, debate spilling over the sports pages and 
even hitting page one of the New York Times. Just as his World Cup counterpart 
would do later that same month, MLB Commissioner Bud Selig admitted that the 
sport would have to reconsider whether to expand use of instant replay beyond 
determining whether a ball hit over the fence was fair or foul.
5
   
As technology advances, proposals to improve sports officiating by 
technological means—from using instant replay to review calls made by officials, 
to deploying electronic eyes that would displace initial human judgments—will 
only gain steam.  Stakeholders of every variety—fans, players, owners, coaches, 
and broadcast partners—have already weighed in. But lawyers and law professors 
have not been particularly vocal or visible contributors to the debates.
6
  This essay 
aims to rectify that imbalance. 
I have argued elsewhere that formal organized sports systems have much 
more in common with ordinary legal systems than is generally appreciated and, 
therefore, that legal theorists might find much both to learn and to teach by paying 
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closer attention to the world of sports.
7
  Like legal systems, organized sports 
systems—by which I mean, to a first approximation, sports that feature written 
rules, rulemakers, and (at least at some levels of play) rule-enforcing officials—
seek to facilitate and regulate behavior principally by means of general rules laid 
down in advance, rather than by individualized directives.  That much is obvious.  
But congruence between the two domains run broader and deeper than is usually 
appreciated.   
Like ordinary lawmakers, gamewrights confront virtually the entire 
panoply of problematics that traditionally engage legal theorists: when to regulate 
behavior “directly,” by means of formal written norms or “indirectly,” by refining 
and strengthening informal social norms; how best to navigate tradeoffs between 
rules and standards; when to delegate discretion to enforcement authorities, and 
how best to constrain it; how to respond to the problem of epistemic uncertainty; 
how to conceptualize, deter, and sanction “cheating”; how to identify and rectify 
the gaps that inevitably arise between “the law in the books” and “the law in 
action”; when to tolerate ties and how to resolve them when they should not be 
tolerated; how to analyze and craft optimal sanctions; and much more.  Given the 
great many similarities in the challenges that sports and law confront and the tools 
at their disposal, sports would richly repay more systematic attention from legal 
theorists and comparative lawyers.  In recent years, econometricians have 
increasingly turned the powerful analytical tools of their discipline on sports.
8
  It 
is past time for jurisprudes to follow suit. 
The use of instant replay technology to review and possibly overturn calls 
made by officials on the field of play is one possible component of a system of 
appellate review of decisionmaking.  It is therefore a natural subject of study for 
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Professionals Play Minimax, REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, Apr. 2003, at 395-415 (testing the 
Minimax theorem using data from penalty shoot-outs in soccer). 
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students of the domain of inquiry that we may denominate the jurisprudence of 
sport.   
* * * 
Although newcomers to the debates over instant replay might suppose that 
the issue presents a single question—whether to employ instant replay or not—it 
is helpful to distinguish at least three sets of questions:  (1) What calls should be 
reviewable?; (2) what should be the procedures be for implementing review?; and 
(3) what should be the standard of review?   
Particularistic answers to the first question must be sport-specific simply 
because each sport has its own rules and therefore its own calls (pass interference, 
strike, offside, traveling, leg before wicket, etc.).  But necessarily sport-specific 
particularistic answers might possibly follow from a more general solution that 
could apply across sports—for example, from a principle that all and only the 
“game-changing calls” should be reviewable, or that review should be available 
for all except the “judgment calls.”  General solutions like these are conceivable, 
but do not seem promising on reflection—partly because the categories of “game-
changing calls” and “judgment calls” might not withstand scrutiny,
9
  and partly 
                                                          
9
 It is difficult to separate types of calls into those that are and are not “game-changing” 
because a particular instance of a call-type that does not usually substantially influence the game‟s 
outcome might be momentous on that occasion.  Imposition of a modest five-yard penalty for 
delay of game or illegal procedure, for example, might push the offense out of field goal position.  
Moreover, whether it does might be known only to the kicker and his coach, which is why critics 
have objected to the NCAA rules that allow booth review only when, among other things, the call 
at issue would have—in the replay official‟s estimation— “a direct, competitive impact on the 
game.”  
 
The distinction between “judgment calls” and “non-judgment calls” might appear more 
promising.  Indeed, although the NFL rules specifically enumerate the reviewable calls, many 
commentators have described—and endorsed—the classificatory principle at work in these more 
general terms. The argument runs like this: Even if we should try harder to get calls right when 
there is a true fact of the matter to discover (like whether the ball hit the ground or crossed the 
plane of the end zone), there just aren‟t simple truths about matters of evaluative judgment (like 
whether some amount of contact was excessive), so subjecting such calls to reply review would 
amount to substituting one official‟s judgment for that of another.  See, e.g., Chad M. Oldfather & 
Matthew M. Fernholz, Comparative Procedure on a Sunday Afternoon: Instant Replay in the NFL 
as a Process of Appellate Review, 43 Ind. L. Rev. 45, 51-52 (2009). 
 
But matters are not quite so neat.  Most importantly, many unreviewable “judgment 
calls” involve elements that are purely factual.  Take the most significant of the unreviewable 
calls: pass interference.  How much contact is necessary to constitute forbidden interference might 
well be a matter of judgment and not properly reviewed.  But what if replay shows that there was 
no contact at all, that the receiver tripped over his own feet?  A mistaken defensive pass 
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because, even to the extent that categories like these are coherent, the costs and 
benefits of review are likely to vary across sports to such a degree as to render 
one-size-fits-all solutions suboptimal.  To focus on just one consideration, any 
review consumes some amount of time, and sports vary in their tolerance for 
delay—soccer, for example, prides itself on the continuity of its play, whereas 
cricket matches are cheerfully interrupted for tea.  So it seems likely that some 
sports will find it desirable to review even some calls that aren‟t game-changers, 
and other sports will reasonably prefer not to review even some calls that are 
thought not to require application of an official‟s (subjective) “judgment.” Much 
the same reasoning would apply to the second question too: procedures for 
instituting review on a given occasion must be sensitive to variations among 
sports on matters relevant to instant replay process.   
Even if answers to the first two questions vary from sport to sport, many 
people seem to think that the answer to the third is fairly general—not necessarily 
that there is one optimal review standard for all sports that institute instant replay, 
but that there is one right answer for many.  The conventional view is that on-field 
calls should be entrenched against reversal such that they may be overturned only 
when the replay evidence is “indisputable” (in the language of the NFL, NCAA 
football, and the CFL) or “conclusive” (e.g., NBA and Test cricket).  Put another 
way, it is standardly accepted that if the reviewing official has any doubt as to the 
correctness of the initial call, he should be instructed to let it stand—even if he 
considers it very probably wrong. 
Precisely because the “indisputable visual evidence” (IVE) standard is 
widely embraced as the appropriate standard of review across disparate sports,
10
 
                                                                                                                                                              
interference call in such circumstances seems like just the sort of thing that review is well suited 
for.   
 
Just as interestingly, reviewable calls can contain unnoticed elements of judgment.  
Consider a potentially game-altering play in the Giants‟ 38-45 loss to the Eagles in Week 14 of the 
2009 season.  After scrambling for a 15-yard gain to escape a sack, Giants QB Eli Manning fell to 
the ground and lost the football.  The Eagles recovered and were awarded possession.  Calls of 
fumble and change of possession are reviewable to determine whether the ball carrier was down 
by contact before losing control of the ball, and the Giants challenged.  Replay showed 
indisputably that Manning‟s knee was down before he lost the ball.  So ordinarily the call would 
be reversed.  But while it was clear that Manning was down, it wasn‟t as clear that he was down by 
contact: Eagles‟ defensive tackle Brodrick Bunkley had grabbed a piece of Manning‟s jersey as he 
escaped the pocket, but Manning took a few steps before hitting the turf, making it unclear 
whether the defensive contact had caused Manning‟s contact with the ground.  If it had, there was 
no fumble; if it hadn‟t, there was.  In the event, referee John Parry upheld the call on the field, but 
neither he nor the broadcast announcers suggested that this was a judgment call, hence not 
reviewable.  
10
 See e.g., Gabrielle Marcotti, Further Review on Instant Replay, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, 
Sept. 25, 2008, available at 
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that is the focus of this essay.  Concentrating on football, I will argue that 
conventional wisdom in favor of IVE likely rests upon mistaken premises, and 
that settled practices should probably be changed.  The analysis unfolds over four 
parts. 
Part I presents a brief history of instant replay review in the NFL.  Part II 
introduces the prima facie case in favor of a less demanding standard than IVE.  It 
is straightforward.  Because the reason to institute instant replay review in the first 
place is to correct officiating errors, the various features of the replay system—
including the standard of review—should be designed to minimize final errors.  
Drawing widely from actual experience with the standard in professional football 
and from longstanding practices in the law, it argues that a standard, like IVE, that 
entrenches the initial call does not serve this interest, and that the goal of error-
correction would be better served by employing a less demanding standard, such 
as de novo review.   
Of course, minimizing officiating errors cannot be the only criterion by 
which to evaluate standards of review: even if a de novo standard of review would 
yield fewer final errors than does IVE, it might nonetheless be suboptimal if it 
proved too costly in other respects. Accordingly, Part III isolates and assesses 
possible counterarguments to the basic case against IVE presented in Part II.  It 
finds unpersuasive the most prominent arguments against a less stringent standard 
of review—that such a standard would intolerably increase reviewing delays or 
would unduly threaten respect for the officials.  However it also identifies other 
reasons to disfavor de novo review—reasons not already well developed in the 
literature—that are likely to resonate with some readers.  It concludes, therefore, 
that no standard of review for the use of instant replay in football obviously 
dominates the alternatives given reasonably divergent empirical assumptions and 
evaluative judgments.  Fortunately, the ambivalence of its conclusion 
notwithstanding, the disparate analyses of Part III allow for a much clearer-eyed 
assessment of the status quo, and of alternative proposals for the use of instant 
replay review, than was possible previously.  Part IV makes good on this claim by 
presenting three novel proposals for revising the football replay system to 
accommodate the different perspectives on the value and costs of error-correction 
that emerge from Part III. 
Because this (partial) roadmap might convey the impression that the trip 
ahead will be of interest (at most) only to readers who are glued to their sets every 
Sunday in the fall, I should assure you that it is not quite so parochial.  First, 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/gabriele_marcotti/09/25/replay/ (arguing that soccer 
should institute instant replay and that the appropriate standard of review is “simple.  Just adopt 
the NFL language.”). 
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although the express focus throughout will be on American football to keep things 
manageable, the argument will draw occasionally from practices in other sports, 
baseball most particularly.  And just as the discussion will sometimes draw from 
other sports, so too will it bear lessons for them: implications for all sports that 
presently use, or contemplate introducing, instant replay will rarely lie very far 
below the surface.  Second, we cannot accomplish the narrow goals specified 
without investigating some issues whose philosophical or jurisprudential 
relevance will be apparent even to readers uninterested in sports.
11
  Trying to 
figure out the optimal standard of review for instant replay in football will require 
that we confront difficult questions on such disparate matters as the relevance of 
both desert and entitlement to justice, the possible difference between mistakes 
and errors, and the likely shape and strength of varieties of cognitive bias.  
Furthermore and finally, while the first four parts of the essay are 
principally in service of the idea that law has something to teach sports, law and 
lawyers don‟t have all the wisdom.  The jurisprudence of sport, after all, is 
predicated on the belief that sporting practices and norms can teach lessons for 
ordinary legal systems just as surely as the other way around.  Part V illustrates 
this proposition by drawing from replay practices in professional and collegiate 
football reason to believe that the Anglo-American criminal trial system might be 
profitably reformed to accommodate three verdicts, not two. 
 
I.  UNDER REVIEW: VIDEO REPLAY IN THE NFL 
Riding Terry Bradshaw‟s arm and their fearsome Steel Curtain defense, 
the Pittsburgh Steelers defeated the overmatched Los Angeles Rams 31-19 in 
Super Bowl XIV to win an unprecedented fourth championship.  Yet some 
observers (especially on the Gulf Coast) thought that the Steelers‟ victory was 
tainted.  Two weeks earlier, they had beaten the Houston Oilers in the 1980 AFC 
Championship Game by the seemingly lopsided score of 27-13.  But the final 
score was misleading.  With the Steelers up 17-10 in the closing seconds of the 
third quarter, Oiler quarterback Dan Pastorini hit Mike Renfro in the back of the 
end zone.  Although Renfro appeared to have control of the ball with both feet in 
bounds before tumbling out of the end zone, officials ruled the pass incomplete 
and the Oilers had to settle for a field goal.  The Steelers scored 10 unanswered 
points in the fourth quarter to clinch the victory and a trip to Pasadena.  Television 
replays at the time, however, showed, clearly enough to most viewers at home, 
that Renfro had control before he fell out of bounds.  It should have been a 
touchdown. 
                                                          
11
 You might think me overly optimistic in anticipating that anyone uninterested in sport 
would have read far enough to reach this footnote.  However even legal theorists have mothers. 
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The “Mike Renfro Game” had legs.  Six years later, NFL owners cited it 
and other miscalls when voting to introduce a system of instant replay review for 
the 1986 season.
12
  Under the inaugural system, review was entirely in the hands 
of a single replay official sitting in a booth who, armed only with the broadcast 
feeds and two VCRs, had sole authority to review a limited range of calls, mostly 
relating to possession (like fumbles and receptions) and boundaries (the sidelines 
and goal lines).  A call could be reversed only if the evidence that it was incorrect 
was “indisputable.”  
This was hardly a streamlined system, and it predictably produced lengthy 
delays.  By 1991, replay officials reviewed over a thousand calls at an average of 
over three minutes each, adding nearly 15 minutes to each game.
13
 Moreover, the 
NFL acknowledged that fully 13% of the reversals were mistaken.
14
  In 1992, the 
owners voted to eliminate video replay. 
If the abandonment of that initial system was unsurprising, its eventual 
return was even less so. There were murmurings, for example, when the Buffalo 
Bills lost a 1996 playoff game to the Jaguars, after the Jaguars recovered a fourth-
quarter Jim Kelly fumble and drove for the winning field goal, while television 
replays revealed that Kelly had been down by contact before losing the ball.  But 
discontent reached a boiling point two years later.   
In week 13 of the 1998 season, the Bills were again victimized by a bad 
call in a 25-21 loss at New England, as the Patriots‟ game-winning, time-expired 
touchdown came two plays after Patriot receiver Shawn Jefferson, clearly out of 
bounds, was credited with a reception for a first down on a desperation fourth-
down pass.   And the next week, the Seahawks lost to the New York Jets, when, 
with seconds remaining, quarterback Vinny Testaverde snuck in on fourth and 
goal from the Seattle 1 to give the Jets a thrilling 32-31 victory.  Problem was, the 
Seattle defense had clearly stopped Testaverde a good yard from the goal line.  
That “phantom touchdown” cost Seattle a playoff berth and Coach Dennis 
Erickson his job.  Then, in the first round of those playoffs, the 49ers knocked off 
the visiting Packers 30-27, thanks in part to the referees‟ failure to call a Jerry 
Rice fumble on the winning drive.   
Responding to season-affecting mistakes such as these, the owners voted 
overwhelmingly to reintroduce a new instant replay system on a trial basis to start 
in 1999.  Rich McKay, general manager of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers and co-
                                                          
12
 What If the NFL Had Not Employed Instant Replay, ESPN, Feb. 13, 2007, available at 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2764251.  
13
 Lonnie White, Instant Replay—Football: NFL Gives It a Second Look, and Tagliabue 
Says New Computerized System Is Huge Improvement Over Version Used in the Late „80s, 
L.A.TIMES, Sept. 12, 1999. 
14
 Id. (noting that 12 of 90 reversed calls were mistaken). 
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chairman of the NFL competition committee, explained the league‟s reasoning 
succinctly: “we want to get the play right.”
15
  As the NFL‟s Senior Vice President 
for Broadcasting, Val Pinchbeck, elaborated, the league doesn‟t “want anyone not 
going to the Super Bowl because of an error that could be corrected.”
16
   
That trial system, occasionally modified, was made permanent in 2007.  It 
differs from the system that the league had employed from 1986 through 1991 in 
several respects.  First, it provides that many more calls would be reviewable—a 
list that the league has periodically expanded.
17
  Second, except in the final two 
minutes of each half, replay is initiated, not by a replay official, but by the head 
coaches who are permitted two challenges per game, and a third if each of the first 
two is successful.  An unsuccessful challenge costs the challenging team a 
timeout.  Third, the review itself is conducted, not by a booth official, but by the 
referee who is given access to feeds from all stadium cameras, but is permitted to 
view the video for only one minute. 
One critical feature of the system has not changed over these many years: 
the standard of review.  The rules on this point are very clear: “A decision will be 
reversed only when the Referee has indisputable visual evidence available to him 
that warrants the change.”
18
 
 
II.  THE NUTSHELL CASE AGAINST IVE 
The goal of instant replay is to correct officiating errors—or at least those 
errors that are both correctible at reasonable cost, and consequential.  Because 
form should follow function, the instant replay system should be designed to 
minimize (consequential) officiating errors.  More precisely, the various features 
of the system—including the standard of review—should be chosen to maximize 
error correction up to the point at which the marginal cost exceeds the marginal 
                                                          
15
 Thomas George, N.F.L. Backs Limited Replay After Complaints of Bad Calls, N.Y, 
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1999, at A1. 
16
 Charean Williams, Play it Again: The NFL‟s Instant Replay Isn‟t Always the Last 
Word, ORLANDO SENTINEL (1999).  
17
 Reviewable calls include: all those related to whether a player or ball did or did not 
cross a goal line or side line; whether a pass was completed or intercepted; whether a pass was 
touched by an ineligible receiver or by a defender, and whether it was thrown beyond the line of 
scrimmage; whether a ball carrier was down by contact before losing control of the ball; whether a 
kick attempt was good, when not higher than the top of the uprights as it crossed the goal post; 
whether there were too many players on the field; and the spotting of the ball when a correct spot 
might determine whether the offense is awarded a first down.  NFL Rules, Rule 15, § 9.  The list 
of unreviewable calls is much longer.  Some of the more common and consequential include 
offside, holding, pass interference, unsportsmanlike conduct, status of the clock, forward progress 
not relating to touchdowns or first downs, and recovery of a loose ball in the field of play. 
18
 NFL Rule 15 Section 9. 
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benefits.  Call this the Pinchbeck Principle.  Stripped to its essentials, the 
argument against IVE is that it does not satisfy this desideratum, and that a more 
relaxed standard of review—something like the law‟s de novo standard of 
review—would. 
A. The Heart of the Argument 
“Indisputable visual evidence” is an extraordinarily stringent standard—on 
its face, more demanding than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof 
that governs criminal trials.  The intended consequence is to drastically minimize 
the number of times a correct initial call is reversed.  A second consequence—not 
intended, but surely foreseeable—is to ensure that a large number of mistaken 
initial calls are permitted to stand uncorrected.  Put another way, if the standard is 
complied with, correct on-field calls will be overturned very rarely.  That‟s good.  
But incorrect on-field calls will be allowed to stand very frequently.  That‟s bad.  
From an error-minimization standpoint, the only question is which effect is 
greater relative to a more neutral or less deferential standard of review: the 
reduction in erroneous reversals or the increase in erroneous affirmances? 
Surely, however, this is not a difficult question.  On the assumption that 
reviewing officials‟ beliefs track reality tolerably well—or, more precisely, that 
they are not systematically biased in one direction or the other
19
—the league 
would minimize the combination of erroneous final calls by instructing each 
official to announce the ruling that he believes is more likely than not correct.  
Error minimization, after all, is precisely the rationale behind the law‟s 
preponderance of the evidence—or “more likely than not”—standard of proof.
20
  
                                                          
19
 This is a critical assumption that, although generally reasonable, isn‟t always.  
Consider three-card monte.  What makes this con successful is that the mark‟s beliefs are poor 
guides to truth.  If you‟re looking for, say, the red ace, you might do better not picking the card in 
which you have most confidence.  The possibility of similar and systematic mismatch between 
facts and beliefs is something a legal system should take into account.  For example, controlled 
experiments repeatedly demonstrate that people place vastly too much credence in eyewitness 
testimony—a proposition that the large number of cases of DNA exoneration vividly bolster.  So 
when only one party to a lawsuit introduces such testimony, factfinders are likely to be more 
confident in that party‟s case than is warranted.  Or suppose that jurors systematically overweight 
the testimony of police officers. If so, then use of the preponderance standard in criminal trials 
might produce more false positives than would an epistemically unbiased factfinder.  A standard 
of proof greater than preponderance could help counter this bias, and actually increase total 
accuracy.  Unsystematic biases—biases that sometimes favor one party, sometimes the other—
might wash out in the long run.  But when a legal system is infected by recurring and nonrandom 
biases, then the more-likely-than-not standard of proof might not minimize total errors relative to a 
heightened (or lowered) standard designed to offset the bias. 
20
 See, e.g., DH Kaye, The Error of Equal Error Rates, 1 Law, Prob. & Risk 3 (2002) 
(discussing and criticizing the competing hypothesis that preponderance of the evidence equally 
allocates errors). 
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Much as unbiased jurors will, in the aggregate, minimize the sum of false 
negatives and false positives by announcing verdicts in accordance with the facts 
they believe more likely than not correct, so too would replay officials minimize 
the sum of erroneous affirmances and erroneous reversals by announcing the 
rulings in which they have the greater confidence.  If, as would appear, replay 
officials have good access to the facts, strongly deferential review all but ensures 
more errors than necessary. 
B. The Saints Go Marching In (An Illustration) 
The 2010 NFC Championship Game came down to this: a 40-yard field 
goal attempt by Saints‟ kicker, Garrett Hartley, less than five minutes into 
overtime.  A successful try would earn New Orleans a trip to Miami for the first-
ever Super Bowl in the „Aints lackluster 43-year history; a miss would give the 
visiting Minnesota Vikings possession at their own 30-yard line and another 
chance to break the hearts of the Saints‟ long-suffering fans.  Minnesota called 
time to ice the third-year kicker, but Hartley was unnerved, splitting the uprights 
for a thrilling 31-28 Saints‟ victory and a date against the favored AFC Champion 
Indianapolis Colts, whom they would defeat two weeks later. 
Although the contest had seen more than its fair share of big plays and 
controversial calls, the game-winning drive was unusually event-filled, with four 
close and questionable rulings occurring over an extraordinary span of just five 
plays.
21
  Three of the calls, all in the Saints‟ favor, were particularly close:  a first-
down call on a fourth-and-one leap over the pile by Saints‟ running back Pierre 
Thomas; a dubious pass interference call against Minnesota linebacker Ben Leber 
that gave the Saints a twelve-yard gain; and a reception by wideout Robert 
Meachem—for another twelve-yard pick up—on a low Drew Brees delivery over 
the middle.   
By rule, the pass interference call was unreviewable, but replay officials 
did review the Thomas first down and the Meachem reception, eventually 
upholding both close calls for want of the “indisputable visual evidence” required 
for reversal.  Meachem‟s reception was an especially bitter pill for Vikings fans, 
for the ball clearly did hit the ground.  Possibly, Mechem maintained possession, 
but most observers didn‟t think so.  The consensus was that the call on the field 
                                                          
21
 The game‟s conclusion was noteworthy for another reason too.  It prompted the NFL to 
change its overtime rules to reduce the influence of luck in calling the coin toss by providing that a 
team cannot win a playoff game in overtime just by scoring a field goal on the first overtime 
possession.  See generally David Fleming, The Making of NFL Rule 16, ESPN The Magazine, 
Dec. 27, 2010, at 74. The new rule provides that “If the team that possesses the ball first scores a 
field goal on its initial possession, the other team (Team A) shall have the opportunity to possess 
the ball.  If Team A scores a touchdown on its possession it is the winner.  If the score is tied after 
Team A‟s possession, the team next scoring by any method shall be the winner.”  NFL Rule 16.  
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was mistaken: should not have been ruled a catch.  For example, under the 
headline, “Did Officials Bungle the End Game for Vikings?” the New York Times 
sports blog observed that “Meachem bobbled a catch as he fell to the ground at 
the Vikings‟ 22. The ball appeared to hit the ground and move.”
22
   
But if, as dominant opinion would have it, the call on the field was 
mistaken, most commentators believe that referee Pete Morelli‟s refusal to 
overturn the call was correct too.  Analysts at NBC Sports “agreed with the 
decision.  Though it appears that the call was wrong, the „100 drunks in a bar‟ 
standard requires clear evidence to overturn the real-time ruling.  And clear 
evidence was not available.”
23
  NFL VP of officiating, Mike Pereira, made 
precisely that point when acknowledging that the call could have gone either way 
while insisting that the refusal to overturn the call was, therefore, necessarily 
correct.  Under league rules, he explained, referees are not to overturn on-field 
calls “unless [they] had 150% concrete visual evidence that there was no doubt in 
anyone‟s mind” that the call was mistaken.
24
 
Notice, then, that replay permitted this call to be reviewed; the call was 
probably mistaken; and IVE prevented it from being corrected.  So, we might 
reasonably ask: Was it a consequential mistake?  What would have happened had 
this apparent mistake been corrected? 
Of course, that‟s impossible to answer for sure.  But we can reason 
through some probabilities.  If the referee had ruled, after review, that Meachem 
had not retained possession, New Orleans would have faced third and fifteen at 
the Minnesota 34.  The Saints had converted only 3 of 12 third downs the entire 
game, and their chances at that distance would have been dim.
25
  So the likelihood 
is that (had this probably-mistaken call been corrected) Saints coach Sean Payton 
would soon have faced a difficult choice: go for it on fourth down, attempt a field 
goal, or punt.  No doubt his choice among these options would have been affected 
                                                          
22
 Did Officials Bungle the End Game for Vikings? N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2010, available 
at http://fifthdown.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/did-officials-bungle-the-end-game-for-vikings/.  
23
 Gregg Rosenthal, Pereira Talks About Controversial Calls in Saints-Vikings Overtime, 
ProFootballTalk.com, Jan. 27, 2010, available at 
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/01/27/pereira-talks-about-controversial-calls-in-saints-
vikings-overtime/.  
24
 Championship Playoffs Official Review Bonus Coverage (video), NFL.com, Jan. 27, 
2010 available at http://www.nfl.com/videos/nfl-playoffs/09000d5d816037d3/Championship-
Playoffs-official-review-bonus-coverage  
25
 Over the course of the 2009 season, offenses facing third down and at least 8 yards to 
go had converted just under 24% of the time. Inside 3
rd
 Down Run v. Pass Success, Stampede 
Blue, Jun. 24, 2010, available at http://www.stampedeblue.com/2010/6/24/1533609/inside-3rd-
down-run-vs-pass. I haven‟t calculated the conversion percentage for third and fifteen, but we can 
bet that it was noticeably lower.  
 
 
 REPLAY (3/7/2011) 13 
by how many yards, if any, New Orleans had gained on third down.  But neither 
of the first two options promised great hope for success: an incompletion on third, 
for example, would have left Hartley with a 51-yard field goal attempt, well 
beyond his career long.   
So the chances are good that, one way or another, the ball would have 
been delivered once more into the hands of the powerful Minnesota offense led by 
Brett Favre—the 2009 miracle man who, in his first season in purple and gold 
was coming off perhaps the best season of his 19-year Hall of Fame career, not 
the 2010 version who appeared to be auditioning for the Walking Dead.  And had 
Favre again seen the ball, Vikings fans would have had reason for optimism.  
Their high-octane offense had already shredded the Saints‟ D for 475 yards, and 
their kicker, the 13-year veteran Ryan Longwell, had been money all season long: 
his 92.9% field-goal completion percentage—including two for two at fifty yards 
and beyond—was second best in the league. 
In short, the reception call was probably mistaken, it was correctly upheld 
under the governing IVE standard but probably should and would have been 
overturned under de novo review, and the mistake might well have made the 
difference for the Vikings between going home and going to Miami. To repeat, 
we can‟t know for sure what would have happened had this probably mistaken 
call been reversed—whether the Vikings would have gained possession again 
and, if so, what they would have done with it.  But the thought that it might have 
made all the difference is no mere fantasy.  Recall the rationale for employing 
instant replay in the first place: to ensure, to the best of the league‟s ability, that 
no team doesn‟t go “to the Super Bowl because of an error that could be 
corrected.”  If so, then the 2010 NFC Championship game suggests that the 
standard of review is ill-chosen: it should be de novo, not IVE. 
C. Summary 
Epistemic standards that provide that an initial call cannot be corrected 
after instant replay review unless the reviewing official deems the evidence of 
error “indisputable” or “conclusive” strongly entrench initial calls against 
reversal.  The argument against strong entrenchment—and, equivalently, the 
argument in favor of something like de novo review—can be parsed as follows: 
1.  The NFL should employ that standard of review that would maximize 
the correction of consequential errors except insofar as correcting the marginal 
error is outweighed by marginal costs of the system.  (The Pinchbeck Principle) 
2.  De novo review corrects more (consequential) errors than does IVE.  
(The error-minimization premise) 
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3.  De novo review does not incur more costs than IVE—or not enough to 
outweigh the increased benefits in the coin of error correction.  (The not-
prohibitively-costly premise)   
4.  Therefore, de novo review is preferable to IVE. 
 
III.  IN DEFENSE OF IVE 
I am aware of no systematic defense of the IVE standard.  To my 
knowledge, the NFL itself has never publicly explained the reasoning behind its 
choice of standard, and because the puzzle has received so little attention from 
fans and commentators, it is hard to be sure of all that might be said in its favor.  
That said, I have seen only a handful of arguments in favor of the IVE standard.  
And most, unfortunately, are blog posts.
26
  Some of these arguments are 
implausible on their face;
27
 others are frustratingly enigmatic.
28
  My goal in this 
                                                          
26
 Toward the end of 2009, Duke law professor Joseph Blocher (responding to an article 
that had discussed the IVE standard approvingly, Oldfather & Fernholz, supra note 9) questioned 
the NFL‟s IVE standard of review in a post to Prawfsblawg.  Joseph Blocher, Why Aren‟t Instant 
Replays Reviewed De Novo, PrawfsBlog, Dec. 1, 2009, available at 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/12/why-arent-instant-replays-reviewed-de-
novo.html. That post was picked up by several other bloggers, including George Mason‟s Ilya 
Somin.  Illya Somin, Why Instant Replay Should Be Like De Novo Appellate Review, The Volokh 
Conspiracy, Dec. 2, 2009, available at http://volokh.com/2009/12/02/why-instant-replay-should-
be-like-de-novo-appellate-review/.  Having already completed a draft of this chapter, I wrote a 
short piece for Slate extending Blocher‟s and Somin‟s arguments.  Mitchell Berman, After Further 
Review, Slate, Dec. 22, 2009, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2239018/.  These postings, and 
others, provoked a large number of rejoinders.  I will be quoting from some of those comments. 
Blocher was not the first to recommend that the NFL adopt a less demanding standard of 
review. Nearly a decade earlier, a short piece appeared in the Vermont Law Review proposing that 
“manifest weight of the evidence” would be a preferable standard.  Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, 
Blowing the Whistle on the NFL‟s New Instant Replay Rule: Indisputable Visual Evidence and a 
Recommended “Appellate” Model, 24 Vt. L. Rev. 567 (2000).  That analysis, however, was 
almost entirely based on a peculiar premise.  Observing that, midway through the 1999 season, 
nearly 30 percent of challenged calls had been reversed, Guggenheim concluded that the 
reviewing referees must be applying something less stringent than IVE in practice.  Yet, he further 
noted, league executives expressed satisfaction with the system, so they must want a 30% reversal 
rate.  The “manifest weight of the evidence” standard, he concluded, would capture existing, and 
seemingly desired, practice more faithfully than does the IVE.  Id. at 569-71.  The fly in the 
ointment, though, is Guggenheim‟s assumption that the bare reversal rate can tell us anything at all 
about the standard of review being applied.  That the referees were not applying the IVE standard 
would have been a sensible inference if the calls they had been reversing at a 30% clip had been 
selected at random, but not if, as was the case, the reviewed calls were selected from a vastly 
larger pool by coaches and replay officials who knew what the applicable standard would be. 
27
 See, e.g., Posting of bsharporflat to Slate, 
http://fray.slate.com/discuss/forums/thread/3534251.aspx?ArticleID=2239018 (contending that 
“the essence of sports spectatorship demands that the referee‟s onfield decision take precedence 
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Part is to disambiguate the arguments for IVE and to carefully assess them.  This 
will require some sympathetic reconstruction.  It will also demand more 
argumentative care than “serious” people are usually inclined to devote to the 
subject.
29
  Indeed, some readers will likely find my efforts here perverse on the 
grounds that football is, after all, “only a game.” 
But, of course, my campaign for a rigorous jurisprudence of sport is 
predicated on a contrary assumption—namely, that sport warrants and repays 
exacting analysis.  This is partly because sports present intellectual problems that 
are intrinsically interesting and challenging, and partly because those problems 
are often structurally analogous, sometimes structurally identical, to problems that 
arise in domains of life of greater intrinsic importance.  So solutions in this 
humble domain will often bear fruit for loftier realms as well.  In this way, and 
much like the space program, the jurisprudence of sport promises positive 
spillover effects.  
All sound arguments for IVE should be formulable as challenges to one or 
another step in the argument for de novo review.  Because the conclusion seems 
clearly to follow from the premises, the objections can be grouped as challenges 
to one or another of the first three premises.  Section III.A considers a challenge 
to premise 2—i.e., that the IVE results in more total mistaken calls than would a 
lower standard of review.   On this competing view, there is no need to engage in 
the careful and contestable balancing of pros and cons that premise 3 aims to 
capture because the key consideration that I have claimed to weigh against the 
NFL‟s chosen standard is simply fallacious. This argument, I conclude, is 
meritless. Two additional arguments acknowledge that the IVE produces more 
total errors than would a lower standard but identify countervailing considerations 
that, their proponents believe, justify the more demanding standard all things 
considered: that the IVE is reasonably necessary to reduce the delay that use of 
replay technology introduces; and that the IVE protects against corrupt officials. 
                                                                                                                                                              
over a video-shows-most-likely-correct decision”). Non-deferential review might be a bad idea, 
but the notion that it would flout essential demands of sports spectatorship is hard to take 
seriously. 
28
 See, e.g., Posting of Allen to Prawfsblawg, 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/12/why-arent-instant-replays-reviewed-de-
novo.html#comments.  (“To me the current system makes sense. Deferential review because there 
are instances where the officials see things the cameras can't. Replays overrule the officials where 
the cameras see the same things, and the result is different.”) 
29
 As the venerated English sportswriter Simon Barnes observed, “One thing that sex and 
sport have in common is that stupid people like them both. One important difference is that clever 
people can enjoy sex—and can say that they enjoy sex—without forfeiting their right to be 
considered clever.  However, a clever person who claims to enjoy sport will be considered less 
clever as a result.” SIMON BARNES, THE MEANING OF SPORT 48 (2006). 
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These arguments, in other words, deny premise 3.  They are scrutinized and found 
wanting in Section III.B. 
The most interesting and complex arguments for IVE take on premise 1, 
the Pinchbeck Principle.  The first argument (Section III.C.1) maintains (on two 
distinct grounds) that the league‟s goal should not be to minimize officiating 
errors simpliciter, but to minimize weighted officiating errors, where errors 
produced by mistakenly reversing an initially correct call are worse than errors 
produced by affirming an initially mistaken call. The second argument (Section 
III.C.2) would reinterpret the Pinchbeck Principle.  On this view, the league‟s 
goal should not be to correct officiating mistakes.  Instead, it should be to correct 
officiating blunders.  And while de novo review might correct more mistakes, the 
argument continues, it does not correct more blunders. 
A. Challenging Premise 2:  The IVE Minimizes Total Officiating Mistakes 
I have said that the IVE yields more total errors than would a less 
deferential standard of review on two assumptions: that replay officials 
administering a heightened standard do in fact let stand some calls they believe 
are more likely than not mistaken; and that when a replay official believes, based 
on all the evidence available to him, that an on-field call was more likely than not 
mistaken, he is more likely than not correct. Critics have taken issue with both 
premises. 
I don‟t know how best to respond to the first objection—that, as one blog 
comment put it, “IVE seems to be regularly disregarded and de novo review 
regularly applied, so any call to go to a de novo standard would essentially only 
codify what the refs are already doing.”
30
  This is conceivable, though I‟m fairly 
confident that it‟s a minority view (Vikings fans don‟t share it), and surely not 
one that the NFL itself would advance.  More interesting is the second 
objection—that the refs do apply a highly deferential standard (true IVE, or 
something reasonably close to it), and that doing so is in fact the best way to 
minimize total mistaken calls. 
People who make this argument often start by emphasizing that the IVE 
standard is of review, not of proof.  In the law, factual decisions by juries and trial 
judges are generally reviewed on appeal under the deferential “clearly erroneous” 
standard.   The rationale, of course, is not that the trial judge “knows more than 
his loftier brothers; rather, he sees more and senses more.”
31
  He has access to 
informal types of evidence—things like witness demeanor and the curious gaps 
                                                          
30
 Posting of dsimon to Slate available at 
http://fray.slate.com/discuss/forums/thread/3533936.aspx?ArticleID=2239018 
31
 Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 
Syr. L. Rev. 635, 663 (1971). 
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and pauses in an attorney‟s questioning of a witness—that appear pallidly, if at 
all, in the formal written record that appellate courts review.   Insofar as an 
appellate tribunal might fail to appreciate the extent of the initial decisionmaker‟s 
comparative epistemic advantage, a de novo standard of appellate review is likely 
to increase rather than decrease factfinding errors.  Just as the law‟s “clearly 
erroneous” standard is designed to insulate an initial finding from erroneous 
reversal, so too, the argument goes, does football‟s IVE standard protect initial 
calls precisely because the on-field official is more likely to be right than is the 
reviewing official: “the referee (or jury) is most likely to get the call right because 
he has seen the actual evidence first-hand, while the reviewing official (or 
appellate court) is limited to seeing what was captured on camera (or the court 
transcript).”
32
 
I don‟t think so, for an appellate judge stands in a very different 
relationship to facts that are disputed at trial than does a replay official to facts 
that transpire on the gridiron.  The trial judge and the jury do see more and sense 
more when it comes to evaluating the testimony of witnesses.  But it‟s hard to 
swallow that, in general, a single field official sees more through the single pair of 
eyes with which nature has endowed him than does the replay official who views 
the field of play through, as it were, the lenses of many cameras.  And not only 
does the replay official have access to multiple camera angles, he views the 
images from those cameras in high definition at super slo-motion.  Given the 
epistemic aids that the replay official enjoys and that the on-field official lacks, it 
is implausible that the latter‟s greater physical proximity to the event would make 
a decisive difference.  Indeed, most sports officials know that video review allows 
for more accurate factual determinations than can be made in real time, which is 
precisely why some resist instant replay.  As Italy‟s Pierluigi Collina, the top-
ranked soccer referee in history, complained: “Referees are blamed because they 
are unable to see what can be shown by technology that has made giant steps 
forward. No matter how prepared referees are and how hard they work, they will 
never be able to compete with technology.”
33
 So the suggestion that in general the 
single on-field official has superior access to the facts than does the replay official 
strikes me as patently silly.  If all we are concerned about is improving 
                                                          
32
 Posting of matcliff to Slate available at 
http://fray.slate.com/discuss/forums/thread/3539860.aspx?ArticleID=2239018  
33
 Ref Collina Clarifies Comments on Video Officials, Rediff.com, Dec. 30, 2009, 
available at http://sports.rediff.com/report/2009/dec/30/referee-collina-clarifies-comments-on-
video-officials.htm.  For the ranking of referees by the International Federation of Football History 
and Statistics, see “The World‟s Best Referee of the Quarter of the Century,” International 
Federation of Football History and Statistics, available at 
http://www.iffhs.de/?20e43c03f32b00f31c13f32b17f7370eff3702bb1c2bbb6e08.  
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accuracy—getting the final call right—then a de novo standard of review is more 
sensible.
34
 
None of this is to deny, however, that, even with the benefit of all this 
technology, there are some cases in which the on-field official is better situated to 
make the correct call—namely, when he had a particularly fortuitous visual angle 
that none of the cameras captured, as might be the case on goal line plays if there 
is no camera on the line.  So let me clarify one thing.  The de novo standard of 
review is sometimes described as a directive to the reviewing court to ignore or 
disregard the decision of the lower court—to proceed as though writing on a clean 
slate.
35
  Consistent with this description, you might think that were a referee to 
review the play afresh, he must ignore the initial call entirely, trying to expunge 
from his mind any knowledge of it.  That is not my suggestion.  The on-field 
official is analogous to a judge in some respects.  But he‟s analogous to other 
legal actors too; referees and umpires are sometimes described as a combination 
of judge and police.
36
   For present purposes, though, it‟s more helpful to think of 
him as a third familiar player in a legal drama: the eyewitness.   
Were a replay official to review plays de novo, then, far from striving to 
wipe from his mind the initial on-field call, he should respect it as the testimony 
of an eyewitness.  Like all eyewitness testimony, sometimes it‟s really good 
evidence, sometimes not.  But anytime the video evidence leaves a replay official 
close to equipoise, he‟d be wise, even when applying de novo review, to go with 
the on-field call.  This wouldn‟t be a matter of deferring to a judgment that 
departs from his own, but of reaching a judgment based on all the available 
                                                          
34
 One commentator has opined that “[a] de novo standard and the absence of deference it 
entails would suggest that there is little confidence in on-site officials‟ ability to generally make 
the right call.”  Guggenheim, supra note __, at 578.  Not so.  A de novo standard suggests (indeed, 
assumes) only that the on-site official does not generally have greater ability to make the right call 
than does the replay official—although, as the text goes on to explain, such a standard could and 
should be used in a way that recognizes that the on-site official will sometimes have greater ability 
to make the right call than would the reviewing official.  Ironically, if any standard suggests a lack 
of confidence in officials‟ ability, it‟s the IVE, which suggests little confidence in the ability of 
those reviewing the play to make the right call notwithstanding the patent epistemic advantages 
they enjoy. 
35
 See, e.g., Mayer v. Montgomery County, 794 A.2d 704, 716 (Md. App. 2002) (“A de 
novo proceeding is one that starts fresh, on a clean slate, without regard to prior proceedings and 
determinations. A true trial de novo ... puts all parties back at „square one‟ to begin again just as if 
the adjudication appealed from had never occurred.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted; 
emphasis added). 
36
 See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Baseball and the Rule of Law Revisited, 25 Thom. Jeff. L. 
Rev. 17, 25 (2002). 
 
 
 REPLAY (3/7/2011) 19 
evidence—including the contemporaneous report of a well-positioned witness to 
the event.
37
 
B. Challenging Premise 3: A De Novo Standard Imposes More Costs than IVE 
The third premise in the argument against entrenchment is, thus far, the 
least well supported.  Indeed, the claim that a de novo standard would not 
meaningfully increase the costs of review has to this point just been asserted, not 
argued for.  My strategy, following a natural enough dialectic, is to consider 
contrary arguments here, as challenges to the prima facie case against IVE.  Some 
considerations in favor of IVE—those that focus on reversal as itself a cost—
could be couched as arguments either that de novo review imposes greater overall 
costs  than IVE or that de novo review does not minimize total weighted errors.  I 
will defer discussion of those arguments to the next section.  Here we assess 
purported reasons not linked to the supposedly greater costs flowing from each act 
of reversal why the costs of a reply system increase as the standard of review 
becomes less stringent. 
1.  De novo review produces too much delay.  The introduction of video 
replay slows down the game.  No doubt about it.  That‟s one reason to eliminate 
instant replay entirely.  Now, the NFL power structure doesn‟t think it‟s good 
enough on balance, and I happen to agree.  But if you think otherwise, and 
assuming your view isn‟t based on a mistake about the empirics—say, about how 
much time video replay adds—then I have nothing to say to persuade you 
                                                          
37
  Compare Judge Jack Weinstein‟s observation that “ „de novo,‟ while reflecting the 
usual Latin obscurantism of the law, does not really mean the judge will decide as on a clean slate 
without considering the decision of the administrator (or on appeal the decision also of the trial 
court). Even the most egocentric federal judge applying de novo review will give some weight to 
what the presumably more expert or experienced plan administrator actually did, even if that 
weight is applied sub rosa or subconsciously.”  Mood v. Prudential Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp.2d 267, 
271 (EDNY 2005).  Consider too debates over the proper review of patent claims construction 
after the Supreme Court‟s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370 
(1996).  See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(en banc) (Plager, J., concurring) (“Though we review [the] record „de novo,‟ meaning without 
applying a formally deferential standard of review, common sense dictates that the trial judge's 
view will carry weight.”); id. at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring) (“[O]ur adoption of the rule that 
claim construction is an issue of law does not mean that we intend to disregard the work done by 
district courts in claim construction or that we will give no weight to a district court's conclusion 
as to claim construction, no matter how the court may have reached that conclusion.... [W]e 
approach the legal issue of claim construction recognizing that with respect to certain aspects of 
the task, the district court may be better situated than we are, and that as to those aspects we 
should be cautious about substituting our judgment for that of the district court.”). 
I am open to the possibility that, for this reason, a referee engaged in de novo review 
might properly have upheld the on-field ruling that Meachem had made a clean reception in 
overtime of the 2010 NFC Championship Game. 
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otherwise.  Arguments that could decisively adjudicate this particular tension 
between the competing values of accuracy and finality are not in the cards. 
But the issue isn‟t whether to implement video replay or not, it‟s what the 
standard of review should be once it is implemented.  Total delay is a function of 
two variables: the number of challenges and the time taken to review each one.  
So a heightened standard like IVE might conceivably speed up the game—or, put 
better, reduce the delays that video replay introduces—by addressing either of 
these factors.  It might deter challenges, or it might reduce the time for review 
once a challenge is initiated (or it might do both).
38
 
We don‟t want challenges because they disrupt the flow of the game, 
making it less aesthetically pleasing and trying fans‟ patience.  True, we might 
suppose that, once a call has been challenged, we want to get it right.  But we 
employ a heightened standard as a way to reduce the challenges in the first place, 
for a coach is less likely to challenge a call, thereby disrupting play, to the extent 
he thinks his challenge will fail (at the cost of a timeout).  In a sense, then, the 
IVE could be understood as a type of threat justified principally on grounds of 
deterrence: even if carrying out the threat (that challenged calls will be reviewed 
under a highly deferential standard instead of under a standard calculated to 
maximize accuracy) is costly, the policy might nonetheless be justified all things 
considered by the good that the threat produces—invisibly, as it were—by 
preventing disruptions that would otherwise occur.  
Although this chain of reasoning does not provide a good explanation for 
the NFL‟s initial adoption of IVE,
39
 no doubt the standard of review should affect 
the number of challenges in just this way were coaches not limited in the number 
of challenges they could make.  But they are limited—to a paltry two challenges 
per game (and a third if the first two succeed).  We need to know, then, whether, 
given the cap, coaches would challenge more plays were the standard de novo 
and, if so, what the aggregate increase in review-associated delay would be.  
For at least two reasons, challenges and delays might be expected to 
increase under a less strict standard of review notwithstanding the existing limit 
on challenges.  First, the fact is that coaches do not use up all their challenges 
under the present system.  Since 2004, the number of coaches‟ challenges made 
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 Although delay is one of the most common arguments given by defenders of a 
heightened standard of review, see, e.g., Oldfather & Fernholz, supra note 9, at 63, these two 
mechanisms are rarely distinguished. 
39
 The IVE standard was in place when the NFL first implemented replay review back in 
1986 even though review was initiated by the replay official and not by the head coaches.  While I 
do not believe that a justification for a practice is discredited merely because it arises post hoc, 
some might think that the fact that this rationale wasn‟t a plausible explanation licenses skepticism 
about its force. 
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each season has remained fairly constant at nearly 1 per game (not per team).
40
 
Under a significantly more lenient standard, however, we might reasonably expect 
coaches to come close to exhausting their allowed challenges, yielding perhaps as 
many as three more reviews per game,
41
 and conceivably as many as five 
additional reviews if two successful challenges still earned coaches a third.  
Second, perhaps we should not treat the existence of a hard ceiling as a given.  No 
doubt the league could limit coaches to two challenges per game (and three if the 
first two were successful) no matter what the standard of review.  But pressure to 
increase the number of allowed challenges might increase as the reviewing 
standard becomes less demanding.  Fans often bristle when, because it has 
exhausted its challenges or its time outs, their team is unable to challenge a call 
that appears ripe for reversal, and there will be many more such instances the 
lower the standard of review.  So a relaxation of the standard of review from IVE 
to de novo might bring within its train an increase in the number of challenges 
each team is permitted. 
I am not impressed by the second argument.  Any pressure to give coaches 
more challenges is resistible.  If, in the event, it isn‟t resisted, that will bespeak a 
judgment that correcting additional errors is worth the price in somewhat greater 
delay. 
The first argument, however, cannot be so easily dismissed: almost 
certainly, more calls would be challenged were the league to lower the standard of 
review while preserving the basics of its current replay system.  Still, the league 
would have several means available to mitigate the impact on total game time.  
First, if least significantly, the league could repeal the rule that awards a team a 
third challenge when its first two are successful.
42
  Second, delay would decline if 
booth challenges were abandoned, and a lower standard of review would make 
that salutary change more palatable.  Since 2004, two replay trends stand out: 
first, the number of booth-initiated reviews has steadily increased while the 
number of coaches‟ challenges has remained nearly constant at 300 per season; 
second, while the coaches have been increasingly successful with their challenges, 
the success rate for booth-initiated review has fluctuated from a low of 22% in 
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 See statistics at nflgsis.com. 
41
 Then again, because “timeouts are precious,” see Dave Anderson, Replay Instant 
Replay, NY TIMES, Marc. 11, 1997, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/11/sports/replay-instant-replay.html?pagewanted=2&src=pm 
(quoting Bill Parcells), coaches would still use their challenges cautiously even if the likelihood of 
success were somewhat greater than it is now. 
42
 As I will explain later, I think that rule is appropriate—indeed, probably too 
grudging—when the standard is IVE.  See infra Section IV.C.  But a hard cap is much less 
objectionable when the standard is de novo.  This is essentially for reasons that track the 
mistake/blunder distinction to be introduced infra Section III.C.2. 
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2004 to a high of 35.64% in 2007.  In 2010, nearly 44% of all coaches‟ challenges 
were successful compared to a mere 25% for booth-initiated reviews.
43
 What all 
this means, of course, is that booth-initiated reviews contribute disproportionately 
to total replay-associated delay while offering considerably less in the way of 
error-correction.   
At the same time, booth reviews often interfere significantly with the 
game‟s competitive dynamic because they stop the clock during a period of the 
game in which the teams are particularly likely to have asymmetric interests in 
stoppage—either the offense benefits because it‟s rushing against the clock, or the 
defense welcomes stoppage so it can catch its breath and make desired 
substitutions against a hurry-up offense.  Against all this, booth review is justified 
on the grounds that, during the high-pressured end of halves, coaches shouldn‟t 
face the added burden of having to decide quickly, before their assistants have 
reviewed the play from the broadcast feeds, whether to challenge close calls.  
That‟s a defensible judgment.  However, coaches will need less time to decide 
whether to pull the trigger if they face a less deferential standard of review.  
Other reasons to worry less about added delay derive from a consideration 
already mentioned: total delay is a function not only of the number of calls 
reviewed, but also the average duration of each review.  Presumably, the replay 
official will frequently exhaust the limited time allotted him no matter what the 
standard of review is.  So a choice between these two standards will affect review 
time in only two circumstances.  If the reviewing official comes quickly to 
conclude with confidence that, regardless of whether the initial call was correct, 
no more careful attention to additional camera angles will be able to establish that 
that call was indisputably mistaken, then the IVE standard would permit him to 
wrap things up faster than would a de novo standard.  On the other hand, if he 
promptly determines that the initial call was wrong more likely than not, and 
would use additional time only to mine for the shot that would seal the deal—that 
is, to assure himself that the incorrectness of the on-field call is indisputable—
then the de novo standard would speed things up.  My sense, as a reasonably 
experienced spectator, is that the latter circumstance is likely to predominate over 
the former.  If so, we might expect a slight reduction in average time of review 
under de novo review even if the league keeps its present 60-second limit on the 
time a referee may watch the video.  Even more importantly, the league might feel 
emboldened to further lower the time limit.  Lastly, there are other ways too that 
the league could reduce the average time for review.  I‟ll propose one in Part IV. 
2.  De novo review facilitates corruption.  A second reason to believe that 
de novo review would be costlier than IVE invokes what one sports fan has 
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dubbed “the Tim Donaghy angle” after the disgraced NBA referee.
44
  The theory 
is that “requiring a high standard of review for replay discourages refs from 
intentionally making wrong calls at key moments,” which in turn deters refs from 
agreeing to fix games.
45
 
That‟s possible.  But the argument overlooks a flip side: a high standard 
also reduces the likelihood that mistaken on-field calls will be reversed, thereby 
increasing ability of all the officials other than the referee to fix games.  
Moreover, that most subjective of officiating calls—pass interference—is also 
among the calls that can most influence a game‟s outcome.  Yet it has always 
been, and is likely to remain, unreviewable.  (Recall the questionable defensive 
pass interference call against Viking linebacker Ben Leber on the Saints‟ game-
winning overtime drive in the 2010 NFC Championship Game.  Similarly, Seattle 
Seahawks fans are still seething over the offensive pass interference call against 
wide receiver Darrell Jackson that nullified a touchdown reception in the first 
quarter of Super Bowl XL.)  As a consequence, a corrupt field judge, side judge 
or back judge has about all the latitude he‟d need to affect results regardless of the 
standard of replay review.  On balance, then, the IVE would seem to trivially 
affect the NFL‟s vulnerability to game-fixing by rogue officials.  
C. Challenging Premise 1: The NFL‟s Goal Is Not Mistake-Correction 
The third possible defense of IVE runs through premise 1, the Pinchbeck 
Principle.  At first blush, the Pinchbeck Principle would seem uncontroversial.  
To be sure, reasonable people might, for various reasons, disfavor instant replay 
entirely.  But once we have decided to employ it, we must be trying to correct 
officiating errors and should therefore want (all else equal) to correct more of 
whatever errors there be, not fewer.  Because the Pinchbeck Principle seems so 
unobjectionable, it will take more effort to uncover and to clearly formulate 
possible challenges to it. 
Start with the claim that the league shouldn‟t give a fig about correcting 
errors.  As opponents of instant replay review frequently object, “an argument can 
be made that the human factor—in this case a blown call that costs a team 
dearly—is part of the game, part of its lore.”
46
  Now, I‟m not entirely sure what 
this means.  That blown calls are part of the game in the sense that they have 
existed, do now exist, and are not entirely eliminable is beyond dispute.  But as 
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 Although he confessed to giving mobsters inside information about games, for which 
offense he served 15 months in federal prison, Donaghy has steadfastly denied intentionally 
miscalling games in which he officiated. 
45
 Posting of Braziled to Slate available at 
http://fray.slate.com/discuss/forums/thread/3534640.aspx?ArticleID=2239018  
46
 Tony Long, “March 11, 1986: NFL Adopts Instant Replay,” Wired, Mar. 11, 2009, 
available at  http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2009/03/dayintech_0311. 
 
 
 REPLAY (3/7/2011) 24 
Hume taught, it‟s a fallacy to derive an “ought” from an “is”.  Murder, rape and 
robbery are similarly part of human social life.  Yet surely that‟s no reason to 
tolerate more of it than we must. 
The claim, accordingly, is not merely that officiating errors are 
ineradicable but that they are good, that we should not want to reduce them even 
were it costless to do so.  Then-coach of the Chicago Bears Ron Rivera expressed 
this position emphatically after he saw his team lose to the rival Packers on a 
reversed call:  “I can‟t wait for them to get rid of instant replay. . . . They have 
definitely taken out human error and the human nature of football.  It‟s out.  We 
might as well just put robots in the football game and let them play.”
47
  Or as 
George Will put it, “Human error is not a blemish to be expunged from sports, it 
is part of the drama.”
48
  True enough: sport would lose its value in a world of 
human infallibility.  A home run is grand only in a context in which the batter 
might have failed.  But the use to which this observation is put by defenders of a 
heightened standard of review—and by those who oppose instant replay 
entirely—relies upon a failure to distinguish human errors by players from human 
errors by officials.  Sports law professor Howard Wasserman makes clear, when 
explaining his opposition to instant replay, that he equates the two.  “[I]f we 
accept inevitable mistakes by players trying their best,” he asks, “why not also 
accept inevitable mistakes by officials trying their best?”
49
  
But this question is only too easy to answer: We watch sports to witness 
great athletic feats, and the greatness of those feats is enhanced by the ever-
present possibility, sometimes realized, of failure and error.  However, we do not 
watch sports to see great officiating feats.  We want the officials to remain in the 
background—which is why, while many commentators mocked Chief Justice 
Roberts‟s contention, made during his confirmation hearings, that “judges are like 
umpires,” not one, as far as I‟m aware, took issue with his observation that 
“nobody ever want to a ball game to see the umpire.”
50
  Simply put, unlike 
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 Fred Mitchell, Picture Fuzzy to Bears, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 6, 1989, at C1, quoted 
in Oldfather & Fernholz, supra note 9. 
48
 George Will, The End of the Umpire? Foul!, CHI.CAGOTRIBUNE, June 19, 2008, at 
C27. 
49
 Posting of Howard M. Wasserman to Sports Law Blog, Howard Wasserman, “Against 
Instant Replay,” Sports Law Blog, Sept. 10, 2007, available at http://sports-
law.blogspot.com/2007_09_01_archive.html. In the same vein—though provoking the question 
“Does Wilson know what catchers do?”—Buffalo Bills owner Ralph Wilson objected to instant 
replay, reasoning that “it takes the human element out of the game, that it‟s like baseball doing 
away with the catcher and using a computer to call balls and strikes.” Thomas George, Owners 
Renew the Instant Replay, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 1990, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/13/sports/owners-renew-the-instant-replay.html. 
50
  For criticism of the analogy, see Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Interpretation: 
Non-originalism, Philosophy Compass (forthcoming). 
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players‟ errors, officials‟ errors serve no useful purpose as foil to the greatness 
that we hope to glimpse.  And there is no danger that efforts to reduce—and even, 
in places, to eliminate—officials‟ errors will threaten to eliminate players‟ errors 
too.
51
 
In any event, the present question is not whether to have instant replay 
review.  The answer to that question we are taking as settled.  It is hard to fight 
the proposition that the rationale for instant replay is to correct officiating errors.  
(What else might it be?)  A frontal assault on the Pinchbeck Principle is therefore 
extremely unpromising.  The third set of arguments, then, seek to refine or modify 
the Pinchbeck Principle in such a way as to render false one or both of the 
additional premises (the error-minimization premise, and the not-prohibitively-
costly premise) needed to generate a conclusion against IVE.  One set of such 
arguments maintains that the goal should be to minimize total weighted errors, 
and that erroneous reversal is more costly than is affirmance of erroneous initial 
calls.  A second set accepts that the goal is to minimize errors, but redefines errors 
in a way different from how we have understood it thus far, a redefinition that 
would make the second premise false.   
1.  The IVE minimizes total weighted errors.  We have said that, on 
plausible assumptions, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard minimizes 
total adjudicatory errors.  It is the law‟s favored standard of proof when it deems 
errors in favor of each party to a lawsuit equally bad.  But there is no necessary 
reason why both errors must be equally bad.  And when they are not, minimizing 
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 I anticipate that most readers will agree with this, on reflection.  Those who are 
unpersuaded might reflect on the increased use of advanced technology not to review calls initially 
made by humans but to replace human decisionmakers in the first instance.  For example, lets in 
tennis, wall touch in swimming, and points in fencing are all determined by technological means 
without relying upon direct human perception. Few fans, other than the most antiquarian or 
nostalgic, think that the introduction of such devices is a loss so long as adequately persuaded of 
their accuracy.  But see Harry Collins, The Philosophy of Umpiring and the Introduction of 
Decision-Aid Technology, 37 J. Phil. Sport 135 (2010) (objecting to such devices when they offer 
a precision that substantially exceeds that which participants and spectators can perceive).  In any 
event, nobody objects to such solutions on the grounds that they eliminate the opportunity for 
officiating error. Well, almost nobody.  Oldfather and Fernholz argue that dramatic considerations 
have persuaded the NFL to preserve its low-tech chain system for measuring first downs despite 
the availability of several more precise high-tech alternatives.  See Oldfather & Fernholz, supra 
note 9, at 74 (citing John Branch, In High-Tech Game, Football Sticks to an Old Measure of 
Success, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2009, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/01/sports/football/01chains.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1).  I 
believe, however, that they overstate the importance to the NFL of “[t]he drama of close 
measurements.”  As I read it, the article that Oldfather and Fernholz cite suggests that the league‟s 
principal objections to laser-based alternatives are their high cost and the fact that they promise 
only trivial marginal increases in accuracy given that the officials‟ spot of the ball would remain 
highly imprecise. 
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total errors should not be the goal of an adjudicatory system.  Instead, the system 
goal should be to minimize total weighted error.
52
  
As readers know, this is not abstract or hypothetical, but reflects the 
conventional justification for criminal law‟s heightened standard of proof.  As in 
tort or breach of contract actions, a criminal trial can result in four basic 
outcomes, as represented by the following matrix. 
 
 The Verdict 
  
Guilty 
 
Not guilty 
 
The  
Facts 
Defendant Guilty 
 
True 
False 
(negative) 
Defendant Not 
Guilty 
 
False 
(positive) 
True 
 
But in this context, most persons think that the two types of error are not 
equal.  No doubt about it: acquitting a guilty defendant is a bad outcome.  Not 
only does it leave him free to reoffend, but many people believe that punishing 
him is a good thing all on its own because, gosh darn it, he deserves it.
53
   But as 
bad as that might be, most folks think that it is far worse to convict and punish 
someone who‟s innocent.  This is a hard thing to establish to the satisfaction of 
those who don‟t see it intuitively, for degrees or amounts of badness (or of 
goodness) are elusive properties.  We can‟t just point and say “see, this is how 
bad it is to be deprived of liberty and stigmatized undeservedly.”  Nonetheless, if 
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 We might say that minimizing weighted error is always the goal (keeping other costs 
constant).  But when the weights or costs of each type of error are equal, minimizing total errors 
and minimizing total weighted errors amount to the same thing.  Either way, I am indulging the 
modestly simplifying assumption that the two types of correct decisions are equally good.  
Interesting recent work on the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof challenges that 
assumption for criminal trials. See Larry Laudan & Harry D. Saunders, Re-Thinking the Criminal 
Standard of Proof: Seeking Consensus About the Utilities of Trial Outcomes, 7 Int‟l Comm. On 
Evidence 2, 1-33 (2009). But the assumption that, when it comes to reviewing on-field calls, 
correct affirmances and correct reversals are at least very close to equally good seems sound. 
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 What precisely is the “it” that he deserves—to be punished?  to suffer?  Something 
else?  For thoughts on this important question that theorists of the criminal law routinely overlook 
see Mitchell N. Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, in R.A. DUFF & STUART GREEN, THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (OUP 2011). 
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we can ultimately do little more than admit to “a fundamental value judgment” 
that punishing the innocent is the greater harm or evil, it is one value judgment 
that seems to be widely shared.
54
 (At least, it‟s widely shared in Anglo-American 
culture, not necessarily at all times and places.  Otto von Bismarck, first 
Chancellor of the German Empire, opined that “it is better that ten innocent men 
suffer than one guilty man escape.”  And Felix Dzerzhinsky, founder of the 
Bolshevik secret police, upon learning of Bismarck‟s view, raised him an 
execution: “Better to execute ten innocent men than to leave one guilty man 
alive.”
55
) 
There is only one way to ensure that the system will produce no erroneous 
convictions: abolish the criminal law, or (much the same) initiate no criminal 
prosecutions.  That‟s what we call a cure worse than the disease.  The better 
alternative is to accept the inevitability that some innocent persons will be 
convicted and punished, while implementing procedural protections designed to 
minimize that outcome at acceptable cost.  Such protections can operate at the 
various discrete stages in the system of criminal punishment, including at arrest 
and at formal charging.  The procedural device that serves most directly to reduce 
the likelihood of convicting those innocent persons who aren‟t weeded out at the 
earlier stages and end up being brought to trial is a heightened standard of proof.  
And that, of course, is the function of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard 
employed throughout Anglo-American criminal law.  Instead of being instructed 
to adjudge the defendant guilty so long as persuaded that his guilt is more likely 
than not, factfinders are required to acquit unless persuaded of the defendant‟s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.   
This is a pretty good way to reduce false positives.  But it too comes at a 
price: Relative to the more-likely-than-not standard, it results in a greater number 
of false negatives—acquittals of persons who are guilty.  This is probably 
obvious.  After all, the whole point of ratcheting up the standard of proof is to 
ensure that some defendants who would have been convicted under the default 
more-likely-than-not standard will be acquitted.  And some number of those 
acquitted folks are in fact guilty.  So increasing the standard of proof produces 
two consequences: fewer convictions of innocent persons and more acquittals of 
guilty persons. 
Less obvious to my first-year law students—but vastly important—is that 
the increase in erroneous acquittals outpaces the decrease in erroneous 
convictions, so that (on reasonable assumptions) the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
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 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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 See Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 173, 195 (1997).  The 
delightful phrase “raised him an execution” is Volokh‟s. 
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standard produces more total errors (false negatives and false positives combined) 
than does the more-likely-than-not standard.  The idea is intuitive enough.  For 
one thing, we have already said that the more-likely-than-not standard operates to 
minimize total errors.  That wouldn‟t be so if departures from that standard 
produced just as few total errors.   
The point can be grasped more easily, perhaps, if we translate these verbal 
standards into rough numerical equivalents.  The more-likely-than-not standard is 
essentially a directive to find for the defendant unless one has at least .51 
confidence in his guilt; the numerical equivalent to the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard is more controversial and probably even less realistic,
56
 but most 
commentators usually peg it in the .90-.95 confidence range.
57
  The only cases 
affected by a choice between the more-likely-than-not and the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standards are those in which the factfinder‟s confidence in guilt 
lies someplace between .51 and, say, .90.  (When the jury is less than .51 
confident in the defendant‟s guilt, they should acquit under either standard; when 
they are more than .90 confident in his guilt, they should convict under either 
standard.)  If, as we assumed earlier, jurors‟ beliefs about a defendant‟s guilt track 
reality pretty well in the aggregate, then it must be that a majority of defendants in 
these cases are in fact guilty.  So for every innocent defendant who is acquitted 
under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard but would have been convicted 
under the more-likely-than-not standard, more than one defendant who is 
acquitted under the heightened standard but would have been convicted under the 
lower standard is in fact guilty.  In sum: the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 
of proof predictably generates more total errors—erroneous acquittals and 
erroneous convictions combined—than would the more-likely-than-not standard. 
Then why use it?  Here we just repeat a point made above: the two types 
of error are not deemed to be equally costly; false positives are much worse than 
false negatives.  So although the heightened standard produces a greater number 
of errors, the ordinary more-likely-than-not standard produces a greater weight of 
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 Psychologists are uncertain just how nuanced human confidence judgments actually 
are.  No doubt the human confidence scale is not calibrated in hundredths: outside of games of 
chance and similar contexts in which we internalize frequentist probabilities, it would be bizarre to 
claim to be, say, .58 confident that p.  Beyond that, however, about all that psychologists are 
agreed upon is that, between the poles of being “certain” that some proposition is true and being 
precisely in “equipoise,” humans can reliably distinguish only among limited categories of 
subjective confidence, frequently grouping their judgments in such broad clusters as more likely 
than not, very likely, and almost certain. For a recent experimental study of how coarse or fine-
grained are people‟s probability judgments, see Yanlong Sun et al., Probabilistic Judgment on a 
Coarser Scale, 9 Cognitive Sys. Res. 161 (2008). 
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 See, e.g., Daniel A. Krauss  & Joel D. Lieberman, Psychology in the Court Room, 133 
(Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2009). 
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total errors.  Put another way, when the two errors are of different magnitudes, 
then a standard that departs from more-likely-than-not is needed to minimize total 
weighted errors. 
If all this is so, then we see a possible defense of the IVE standard for 
instant replay review: if the costs of mistakenly reversing a correct call are simply 
greater than those of mistakenly affirming an incorrect one.  On this rationale, the 
indisputable standard of review yields a greater number of total errors, but less 
weighted error.   Because this rationale would defend the system by analogizing, 
not to the clearly erroneous legal standard of review (as the first argument for IVE 
did), but to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt legal standard of proof, then our 
friendly two-by-two matrix, suitably tweaked, might again provide illumination.   
 
 Result of Review 
  
Affirm 
 
Reverse 
 
 
Initial 
Call 
 
Correct 
 
Correct Final Call 
Mistaken Final Call 
(Erroneous Reversal) 
 
Incorrect 
 
Mistaken Final Call 
(Erroneous Affirmance) 
Correct Final Call 
 
As the matrix nicely displays, there are only two possible final outcomes 
for the final call: it can be correct or incorrect.  But these two possibilities 
correspond to four permutations, for there are two different routes to each of the 
two possible end states.  Moving clockwise from the upper left, they are: (1) a 
correct call affirmed; (2) a correct initial call changed to an incorrect one; (3) an 
incorrect initial call reversed; and (4) an incorrect initial call preserved.  If a 
mistaken final call in the upper right (possibility 2) is worse than a mistaken final 
call in the bottom left (possibility 4), it must be because the value or disvalue of 
the final outcomes varies depending upon the route traveled to reach them: going 
from a correct initial call to an incorrect final call is worse than starting with an 
incorrect initial call and preserving it. 
Why ever would that be?   
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Before hunting down that answer, it is time to get a clearer handle on the 
reason for doubt—the reason, that is, to think that the badness of a mistaken final 
call is independent of the route traveled to reach it. 
 We want the contest to proceed on the path that the players‟ own efforts 
and accomplishments warrant.  If you catch the ball cleanly for a ten-yard gain, 
your team deserves to move ten yards down field.  If you kick the ball off the 
crossbar and over the goal line, your team deserves to be credited with a goal.  If 
the ball beats the batter-runner to first base, the fielding team deserves to record 
an out.  (For extra credit: what if the ball and the batter-runner reach first at the 
same time?)
58
   Every mistaken call—the failure to register as a reception a ball 
cleanly caught, the imposition of a yardage penalty for a phantom infraction, and 
so on—is something to be avoided and regretted precisely because it upsets this 
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 Well, as everybody knows, “the tie goes to the runner.”  So if the ball and batter reach 
first simultaneously, you answered, the batter-runner deserves to be called “safe.” 
Not so fast! 
Universal sandlot wisdom about ties might trace to Major League Baseball Rule 6.05(j), 
which provides that “A batter is out when after a third strike or after he hits a fair ball, he or first 
base is tagged before he touches first base.”  If the batter reaches first at the same time that first 
base is tagged, then the base hasn‟t been tagged “before” he touches it.  And so, one might 
reasonably surmise, he must be called safe.  Unfortunately, two other rules indicate that that 
conclusion would be too quick. 
Rule 6.09(a) provides that “the batter becomes a runner when he hits a fair ball.”  That 
seems both obvious and unproblematic.  Rule 7.08(e), however, provides that “Any runner is out 
when he fails to reach the next base before a fielder tags him or the base, after he has been forced 
to advance by reason of the batter becoming a runner.”  That is, on a force play, the runner—
including, per Rule 6.09(a), the batter who has become the runner—is out unless he reaches the 
base before the ball does.  So it now appears that the rules are hopelessly contradictory: according 
to Rule 6.05(j), the tie goes to the runner; according to Rule 7.08(e), the tie goes to the fielder.  
Indeed, that is precisely the conclusion reached by the sleuth, the philosopher Ted Cohen, who 
first identified this troubling interaction among the rules in a marvelous essay.  Ted Cohen, There 
Are No Ties at First Base, 79 The Yale Review 31 (Winter, 1990) (reprinted in Eric Bronson ed., 
Baseball and Philosophy: Thinking Outside the Batter‟s Box 73-86 (2004) (explaining that when 
he drew this contradiction to MLB officials, advising them to remedy it, he was rebuffed on the 
grounds that, according to the umpires, “there never are any ties”). 
But do the rules really conflict, requiring a choice between them in the case of a tie?  
Strictly speaking, no.  Rule 6.05(j) says only that a batter-runner is out if first base is tagged before 
he touches it.  The rule does not say that a batter-runner is safe if first base is tagged at the same 
that he touches it.  To be sure, that is the most natural implication.  As Cohen puts it, that is the 
rule‟s “import because the other rules do not give any other reason for calling him out.”  I‟d say, 
rather, that that would be the rule‟s inescapable import if the rules did not give any other reason 
for calling him out.  But they do—that‟s the effect of Rules 6.09(a) and 7.08(e).  So the apparent 
contradiction can be escaped by reading 6.05(j) literally, refusing to indulge its negative 
implication.  Cf. Royal American Oil & Gas Co. v. Szafranski, 147 B.R. 976, 982 (Bankr. N.D. 
Okla. 1992) (stating the risks of negative inference as a method of statutory construction).  And if 
we choose that path, we are left with a simple rule: ties go to the fielder!  
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scheme of institutional desert, of how the contest ought to proceed.  All mistaken 
final calls—and only mistaken final calls—work this particular and most basic 
mischief.  What makes an erroneous reversal of an initially correct call bad—
something that it is to be both avoided and regretted—is precisely what makes the 
failure to reverse an incorrect call bad.  In either case, the final call is incorrect, 
causing the rest of the contest to proceed on a different path than the ability and 
effort of the competitors themselves would have warranted.  Moreover, because 
justice is, plausibly, the virtue of allocating goods in accordance with desert, any 
steps taken to reduce mistaken final calls promote justice. 
To see the fundamental equivalence between erroneous reversals and 
erroneous affirmances more clearly—and to appreciate that there might even be 
something artificial or arbitrary about breaking down the officials‟ calls into 
initial call and final call—put aside instant replay review for the moment and 
think only about the common interplay among the on-field officials, like when the 
side judge initially signals a completion before the field judge rules incomplete, or 
when, after consultation on the field, the referee picks up a flag and announces 
“there was no infraction on the play.”  In these cases we don‟t think that the initial 
call should be somehow protected against reversal; we want the call to be right.  
And when we say “the call” we mean “the final call.”  Indeed, the NFL Referees‟ 
Manual is very clear on just this point.  During crew conferences, it instructs 
referees: “Don‟t worry if you feel the decision making process is taking more 
time than you would like or looks bad.  The important thing is to get it right!”
59
  If 
this is so, then the conclusion wouldn‟t seem to differ even if more intermediate 
steps lie between initial call and final call.  If we want the referee to announce the 
call he believes is most likely correct regardless of what the official who first 
weighed in believed, we should also want him to make the call he believes is most 
likely correct regardless of what he had first announced. 
Even granting all this (as I believe we should), erroneous reversal would 
still be worse than erroneous affirmance if reversal itself is a bad.  Existing 
arguments for IVE could be interpreted as maintaining precisely that.  
(a) Reversal is bad because it promotes disrespect for officials.  One of the 
most commonly voiced justifications for a highly deferential standard of review 
maintains that it usefully serves the league‟s need to protect the integrity of the 
game or to preserve respect for the authority of the referees.  I confess that I am 
uncertain what “integrity of the game” means to all those who voice it.   
If by “integrity” we mean something like temporal continuity, then the 
simple rejoinder is that football already and utterly lacks integrity of this sort, 
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 2009 National Football League Referees‟ Manual, National Football League, 53 
(2009). 
 
 
 REPLAY (3/7/2011) 32 
which is one reason that Europeans, accustomed to the uninterrupted play of 
soccer, haven‟t really taken to it.  Or if “integrity of the game” captures the idea 
that mistaken on-field calls are elements that cannot be excised without real loss 
then this seems much like the “blown calls are part of the lore” argument that 
we‟ve just dismissed.  Finally, if the phrase is meant to suggest that more frequent 
reversals would challenge the moral integrity of the officials or of other persons 
associated with the game, the claim should strike us as utterly implausible. 
Most likely, “integrity of the game” is intended just as a fancier and more 
emphatic restatement of the more transparently expressed claim with which it 
almost invariably shares the stage: the need to preserve respect for the officials.
60
  
So how exactly does the IVE standard preserve respect for the officials, and just 
how valuable is that benefit? 
The idea, I suppose, is that there is always something harmful about a 
public reversal of an on-field call even when that reversal sets things right.  The 
public reversal is costly because it tends to undermine the officials‟ authority.  To 
be sure, it‟s good if the final call is right and bad if the final call is wrong.  But, on 
this view, it is worse for a final incorrect call to emerge as the reversal of an 
initially correct call than as the affirmance of an initially incorrect one precisely 
because the former contains a feature of negative value that the latter lacks: the 
very fact of reversal.  (And, by the same reasoning, it is less good for a final 
correct call to emerge as the reversal of an initially incorrect call than as the 
affirmance of an initially correct one.)  We can illustrate this claim by adding to 
our matrix the following arbitrary but illustrative values:  that a call is ultimately 
correct confers a value of +2, that a call is ultimately incorrect confers a value of -
2, and that a call has been publicly reversed confers a value of -1. 
 
 Result of Review 
 Affirm Reverse (-1) 
 
 
Initial 
 
Correct 
 
Correct Final Call (+2) 
Mistaken Final Call 
(Erroneous Reversal) 
(-3) 
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 See, e.g., Oldfather & Fernholz, supra note 9, at 63 (“The NFL . . . has to worry about 
institutional integrity. If the NFL instituted a lower standard of review for challenged plays, more 
calls would likely be overturned. This could eventually impact the public perception of the 
competency of NFL officiating crews.”); Guggenheim, supra note 26, at 569 (opining that IVE “is 
crucial because it maintains the credibility of the officials and avoids fickle determinations by the 
referee”). 
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Call  
Incorrect 
 
Mistaken Final Call 
(Erroneous Affirmance) 
(-2) 
Correct Final Call (+1) 
On this construal of the “respect for officials” defense of the IVE standard, 
the review system should be structured not to minimize the costs of error, but to 
minimize the costs of review, which costs are a function both of the incorrectness 
of final calls and the number of reversals, inter alia.  Because the fact of reversal 
is itself a cost, we do in fact yield differential costs of outcome depending on the 
route we took to get there: a mistaken final call produced by incorrectly reversing 
a correct initial call is more costly than a mistaken final call produced by 
incorrectly affirming an incorrect initial call.   
There may be something to this.  But not nearly enough, I think, to support 
a standard of review as demanding as IVE.
61
 
Most importantly, let‟s not overstate the extent to which a reversal 
undermines respect for officials.  It might well be that a widespread perception 
that officials are getting things wrong would threaten to breed disrespect (or less 
respect) for them.  But it seems unlikely that such a perception will be 
substantially influenced by the total number of reversals of on-field calls. Fans, 
owners, coaches, and players get to watch and rewatch the play in super slo-mo, 
from a variety of camera angles, all in high definition.  Therefore, we don‟t need a 
formal announcement by the referee that an on-field call was mistaken in order to 
conclude that the field official got it wrong; it‟s the evidence from our own eyes 
that licenses such a conclusion.  In short, people will come to disrespect the 
officials if the “visual evidence” suggests to viewers at home that the officials are 
doing a bad job.  If that‟s how it appears, the fact that the calls are rarely reversed 
won‟t protect the officials‟ reputation; and if that‟s not how it appears, then more 
frequent reversals won‟t imperil it.  Indeed, the fact that referees reverse their own 
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 A related but distinct concern is that a lower standard would generate more reversals 
which would thereby threaten intra-crew harmony.  Oldfather and Fernholz, supra note 9, at 52.  
This worry rings hollow to me, though I confess that I‟m going mostly on untutored intuition here, 
and can offer no reason that even I find compelling why the reader who lacks intuitions one way 
or the other should credit my assessment of this worry over Oldfather and Fernholz‟s contrary 
assessment.  Still, I‟ll offer two thoughts that go beyond merely reporting my sense of things.  
First, if reversal by the referee were a real danger to intra-crew collegiality, we might expect 
referees to adhere strictly to the IVE standard.  If you believe, as many do, that the standard in 
practice is not quite as demanding as true IVE, you might take that as some evidence that intra-
branch harmony is not quite so fragile.  Second, insofar as there is merit to this concern, we might 
expect that referees operating under a formal de novo standard would be somewhat more 
deferential in practice, which prediction ought to mitigate some of the objections to relaxing the 
rule.  
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initial calls is further evidence that officials want to get calls right and are not 
overly sensitive about being reversed.
62
 
In any event, the IVE doesn‟t merely accommodate solicitude for the 
officials‟ reputation, but allows it to swamp what would seem to be a much more 
fundamental concern: getting the calls right.  Even if some bias against reversal 
might be warranted, the IVE reflects a bias so pronounced as to suggest that the 
league has lost sight of the reason for instituting replay review in the first place.
63
  
When reputational interests and accuracy come into conflict, Major League 
Baseball knows where to strike the proper balance.  “Umpire dignity is 
important,” the official rule book acknowledges, “but never as important as „being 
right.‟”
64
 
Finally, not only does a concern for the officials‟ dignitary interests not 
justify the costs that IVE produces, such a high standard plausibly risks 
increasing disrespect for officials in two ways.  First, insofar as the fact of 
reversal alone could be perceived as a rebuke, the force of that rebuke varies with 
the standard of review applied.  Although a reversal under the IVE standard is 
most fairly rendered as a determination that, clearly, the initial call was mistaken, 
it can easily be misunderstood as a determination that the initial call was clearly 
mistaken. To anticipate a distinction to come, it is apt to be misperceived as a 
conclusion not just that the official made a mistake, but that he blundered.  
Reversal under the de novo standard does not plausibly send a similar message.  
In short, there will be more reversals under a de novo standard of review than 
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 One of the most notorious reversals in NFL history—the call that made the “Tuck 
Rule” famous—was referee Walt Coleman‟s overturning of his own initial call that Patriot QB 
Tom Brady had fumbled with less than two minutes remaining in a 2002 playoff game against the 
Raiders.  See Richard Sandomir, Referees Turn to Video Aid More Often, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
2002, at D1.  
63
 I am assuming that a nontrivial, perhaps significant, number of calls appear, after 
review, to be probably but not indisputably wrong.  These are the calls that would come out 
differently under the de novo and IVE standards.  However, some readers of this manuscript have 
offered the contrary speculation that, when the replays do not make it indisputably clear what the 
correct call would have been, then they almost invariably leave the reviewing official almost 
precisely in equipoise.  On this view, the reviewing official will (almost) never feel pretty-
confident-but-not-certain that the initial call was mistaken, in which case IVE is not merely better 
than de novo, all things considered, but virtually costless.  It is hard to prove or disprove this claim 
without undertaking a more thorough empirical investigation.  But the fact that referees so often 
use up the entire reviewing time allotted them is, I think, some evidence against this skeptical 
challenge—especially when the review results in a determination that the initial call “stands” (but 
is not “confirmed”).  See infra Section V.A.  As discussed earlier, it seems likely that the referee 
early on determines that the initial call was probably mistaken, and spends the remaining time 
scrutinizing the frames for confirmation.  
64
 MLB Official Rules of Baseball, General Instructions to Umpires. 
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under IVE, but each reversal is more freighted under the IVE standard than under 
de novo. 
Second, high epistemic standards impose significant psychological 
demands on their addressees: they require people to act other than in accordance 
with what they strongly believe to be true.  That people will not reliably adhere to 
such demanding standards is suggested by the raft of experimental evidence that 
people are willing to convict even when significantly less confident of the 
defendant‟s guilt than the most natural readings of the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” instruction would appear to permit.
65
  More to the point, most observers 
would agree that football‟s own replay officials do not strictly abide by the IVE.   
Take just one much-discussed example from week 15 of the 2008 season.  
On the road against their hated division rivals, the Baltimore Ravens, the Steelers 
were down 9-6 late in the fourth quarter, and driving.  With 43 second left to play, 
and on third and goal from the Ravens‟ four-yard line, a scrambling Big Ben 
Roethlisberger hit Pittsburgh receiver Santonio Holmes camped on the front edge 
of the end zone.  Holmes clearly had both feet in the end zone as he caught the 
ball with arms outstretched.  But as he fell forward into the field of play, it was 
unclear whether the ball ever broke the plane of the end zone.  Determining that it 
did not, the officials ruled Holmes down by contact just shy of the goal line.  On 
review, though, referee Walt Coleman reversed the on-field call, awarding the 
Steelers a touchdown—and, with their 13-9 victory, the AFC North title and a 
first-round playoff bye. 
The reversal was, to put it mildly, controversial.  Indeed, just about 
everybody who weighed in thought Coleman got it wrong.  Here‟s one entirely 
representative objection:  “there's no way that last pass to Pittsburgh Steelers wide 
receiver Santonio Holmes on Sunday should have been called a touchdown by 
replay. Perhaps it could have been called a touchdown live, but not by replay.  
The call on the field was not an obvious mistake that needed to be corrected. It 
was a close call that could have gone either way, which means the call on the field 
should have stood.”
66
  Or, as Sports Illustrated‟s Peter King put it: “I didn't see 
the indisputable visual evidence that Walt Coleman saw under the hood in 
Baltimore. It was close, very close, and most likely Santonio Holmes did break 
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 Some of the experimental literature is concisely summarized in Erik Lillquist, 
Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 85, 112-16 (2002). 
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 Patrick MacManamon, Upon Further Review, NFL Replay System, Should Go, AKRON 
BEACON-JOURNAL, available at http://www.ohio.com/sports/mcmanamon/36179439.html 
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the plane of the goal line in Baltimore on the biggest play of the biggest AFC 
game of the weekend, but it was not indisputable.”
67
 
I‟m a lifelong and loyal member of Steeler Nation.  So it pains me to agree 
with the critics.  The ball might have crossed the plane in Holmes‟s possession.  
Like most commentators, I do think it rather likelier than not.  But indisputable?  
Not by a long shot.  The critics were right.
68
   
As we have seen, some fans argue that de novo review is already the 
standard actually employed no matter what the rules say.  That, I have said, is an 
overstatement.  But it speaks to a widespread belief that the IVE isn‟t faithfully 
adhered to.
69
  One might reasonably surmise that these conspicuous departures 
from the formal standard generate disrespect for the league and its officials if 
anything does.  To be sure, the NFL might have ways to promote greater 
compliance with the IVE.  That‟s one way to reduce the gap between what legal 
theorists call “the law in the books” and “the law in action.”  But here‟s another:  
lower the standard.
70
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 Peter King, Indisputable Evidence, Steelers continue to survive in tough games, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 16, 2008, available at 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/peter_king/12/14/Week15/index.html.  
68
 For my own part, I‟m more struck by what the complaints didn‟t say than what they 
did.  I‟ve read more than a dozen, yet haven‟t come across one that asks whether the rules make 
good sense—not one that asks why, on a play on which two teams‟ playoff hopes might well rest, 
officials should deploy a standard that entrenches a split-second call from a side judge stationed 
some 30 yards away and partly screened by a Ravens defender, as against the call that appears 
most likely to be correct after reviewing multiple camera angles in super slo-motion.  Indeed, 
precisely the same pattern would arise 13 months later in fans‟ reactions to the pivotal calls on the 
Saints‟ final drive against the Vikings: most agree that referee Morelli was right, given the 
standard of review, to let the call stand, but not one in fifty wonders why the league should 
employ a standard that directed Morelli to uphold a critical call that was, most fans also think, 
probably wrong. 
69
 See Josh Patashnik, Football, Instant Replay, and Arbitrariness, The New Republic, 
Dec. 8, 2009, available at http://www.tnr.com/blog/the-plank/football-instant-replay-and-
arbitrariness (asserting that “most referees don‟t truly impose an indisputability standard”). 
70
 During the 1980s, Major League Baseball confronted a gap between the law-in-the-
books and the law-in-action of its own: umpires refused to call strikes as high as the rulebook 
required.  After years of unsuccessfully trying to cajole, threaten and importune the umps to call 
higher strikes, MLB settled on a wise solution: it lowered the upper limit of the strike zone from 
the armpits to “the midpoint between the top of the shoulders and the top of the uniform pants.”  
Although this upper limit was still higher than what the umps had been calling, the league office 
reasoned that if the formal rule were closer to what the implementing officials—the umpires—
liked, they‟d adhere to it even if they found it less than ideal.  See Murray Chass, Baseball 
Changes the Strike Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1987, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/08/sports/baseball-changes-the-strike-zone.html.  This episode 
suggests a more general lesson: when the gap between the law-in-the-books and the law-in-action 
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(b) Reversals are utility-reducing on net.  One theme periodically sounded 
in the debate over a standard of review is that proponents of de novo review 
overlook that “sports is entertainment.” One respect in which the entertainment 
value of sports might be thought relevant is clear enough: as we have seen, a less 
stringent standard of review might spell greater replay-associated delay, and delay 
just isn‟t all that entertaining.  However I believe that proponents of the objection 
intend it to have force independent from and additional to the objection from 
delay.  The task is to unearth just what its import might be. 
The central argument against IVE takes what might be termed a 
competitor‟s perspective.  It is not, of course, that other stakeholders are 
necessarily averse to correcting officiating errors: clearly, fans vary in their taste 
for this particular goal.  It‟s just that the value of error-correction gains strength 
from views about what those who participate in a rule-governed competition 
deserve, and about the justice of arranging institutions to yield outcomes that 
comport with desert.  To charge proponents of de novo review with ignoring or 
downplaying the entertainment value of sports is, I think, to criticize them for 
overvaluing the interests of the participants—and even impersonal values like 
justice—at the expense of the desires or preferences of the fans.  So why, we must 
ask, would the entertainment interests of fans militate against less deferential 
review?  This is not obvious, for proponents of the entertainment-based objection 
to de novo review do not claim to have polled fans regarding which standard of 
review they would prefer. 
One possibility, I think, is this.  Roughly, spectators of any sporting event 
can be divided into two groups: those who care who wins that particular contest 
(call them “partisans”) and those who don‟t (“enthusiasts”).  Every call is 
experienced as a benefit by some of the partisans and as a detriment by others; 
some gain utility from the call, others lose it.  So too with every reversal of a call 
already made: to adopt a hedonic idiom, each reversal confers pleasure on 
partisans of the team that benefits while inflicting pain on partisans of the team 
that loses.  This should be uncontroversial.  But its relevance might be unclear—
unless it is to suggest that replay officials should generally respect a bias in favor 
of the home team and against the visitor, or in favor of popular teams and against 
the Bills and the Jaguars. 
That, needless to say, is not the suggestion.  The observation plausibly 
becomes relevant to debates over standards of review, however, if loss aversion 
and the endowment effect are true psychological phenomena.  Briefly, the 
endowment effect is the experimental finding that people value goods they 
                                                                                                                                                              
becomes too great, the former can lose almost all its power to influence behavior.  So, perhaps 
counterintuitively, a loosening of the rules might often produce a tightening of behavior. 
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already own more highly than an identical good they do not own.  Loss aversion 
is the preferred explanation: people prefer avoiding losses to realizing gains.
71
 If 
these cognitive biases exist and apply in this context, then partisans want not to 
lose a call already made that had been to their benefit more than they want to gain 
the benefit of the reversal of a call already made that had been to their detriment, 
even when the magnitudes of the loss and the gain, in terms of probable impact on 
contest outcome, are the same.  Similarly, if the call is reversed, it is experienced 
as a more profound welfare setback by partisans who lose what had been theirs 
than it is experienced as a welfare gain by partisans who did not “own” the call to 
begin with.  If this is true, then holding all else constant (like the size of each 
team‟s fan base), each reversal is utility-reducing on net.  Therefore, each reversal 
is a cost and, as before, the total cost of an erroneous reversal is greater than the 
total cost of an erroneous affirmance.
72
 
All of this could be; it cannot be rejected out of hand.  It would 
nonetheless remain to decide how to weigh this possible utility cost against the 
value of correcting errors.  For one thing, some behavioral psychologists and 
economists question whether loss aversion and the endowment effect exist at all.  
Even if they do, the circumstances that determine whether they materialize and 
what their magnitudes will be are controversial.
73
  More fundamentally, how 
much one thinks differential partisan utility, driven by such cognitive biases as 
may exist, should influence league practices at the expense of allowing more 
mistaken calls to go uncorrected is likely to depend in large part on the extent to 
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 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, 
and the Status Quo Bias, 5 J. Econ. Perspectives 193 (1991).  Another cognitive bias, the omission 
bias, might also be relevant.  But I don‟t think that the omission bias adds anything to loss 
aversion in this particular context.  And because omission bias is somewhat less well understood 
than is loss aversion—in particular, it is far from clear when omission bias is a genuine cognitive 
bias or irrationality as opposed to a moral judgment—I focus here on loss aversion only.  For a 
recent discussion of omission bias, including a review of the literature, see Jonathan Baron & Ilana 
Ritov, Omission Bias, Individual Differences, and Normality, 94 Org. Behav. & Hum. Dec. Proc. 
74 (2004).  
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 See Patashnik, supra note 68.   
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 See, e.g., Ido Erev et al., Loss Aversion, Diminishing Sensitivity, and the Effect of 
Experience on Repeated Decisions, Max Wertheimer Minerva Center for Cognitive Studies, 
(2008). (empirical reevaluation of test results that were explained as proof of loss aversion and 
argument that these results were really a result of a diminishing sensitivity to absolute payoffs); JF 
Shogren et al., Resolving Differences in the Willingness to Pay and the Willingness to Accept, 
American Econ. Rev., March 1994, at 255-70 (criticizing previous tests demonstrating the 
endowment effect for creating a situation of artificial scarcity and providing evidence from more 
scientific tests that suggest no endowment effect).  In light of uncertainty regarding the existence, 
shape, and strength of the relevant phenomena, instant replay is not just an issue that settled 
understandings in psychology can help address; it also provides a context in which psychological 
theories can be tested and refined. 
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which one thinks of professional football first and foremost as sport, thus properly 
governed by (among other things) norms of desert and justice, or as 
entertainment, thus properly governed by norms of happiness and preference-
satisfaction. 
2. The League‟s goal should be to correct errors that are not (mere) 
mistakes.  We have already seen the claim that it‟s misguided even to want to 
eliminate officiating errors.  Stated in that way, the claim is not tenable, indeed it 
is silly.  But precisely because it is so silly, a charitable reinterpretation is in 
order.  Perhaps the many people who express this view really mean to convey 
something a little different.  What that might be is what I aim to explore here. 
Start by marking a simple division between beliefs and actions.  The 
officials‟ calls we have been discussing belong, let us say, to the world of beliefs, 
not of actions.
74
  And we have been assuming that the belief is either right or 
wrong (that‟s the reason for excluding “judgment calls”), and that all wrong calls 
are “errors.”  In other words, to say that the goal of replay review is “to improve 
accuracy” or “to correct erroneous calls” is to say the very same thing.  This 
seems to follow unexceptionally from the dictionary definition of error as “an act, 
an assertion, or a belief that unintentionally deviates from what is correct, right or 
true. . . .  A mistake.”
75
 
But turn attention now to the domain of actions, and consider in particular 
errors in baseball.  An error is a misplaying that permits a batter or baserunner to 
reach one or more additional bases than would have been allowed given “ordinary 
effort” by the fielder.
76
  Suppose the fielder hadn‟t positioned himself well, or is a 
little too slow to a batted ball, or doesn‟t put quite enough mustard on the throw.  
Had he not done this thing, he would have made an out.  In the event, the 
baserunner is safe.  Surely, we can‟t count the fielder‟s play a success.  But we 
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 This is a crude simplification, of course, because the official doesn‟t merely believe or 
disbelieve something; he also does things, like throws a flag and makes a call.  But it‟s not too 
crude for our purposes: in all but the rarest cases, the action flows directly and unproblematically 
from the belief—like the belief that the receiver had possession or the runner‟s knee was down. 
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 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 624 (3d ed. 1992). 
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 The Official Rules are not quite as clear on this point as might be hoped.  Rule 10.13 
provides that “An error shall be charged for each misplay (fumble, muff or wild throw) which 
prologs the time at bat of a batter or which prolongs the life of a runner, or which permits a runner 
to advance one or more bases,” but it does not explicitly define “misplay,” “fumble,” “muff,” or 
“wild throw.”  But the notes make adequately clear that not everything that falls short of the ideal 
counts.  Note (1) directs that “slow handling of the ball which does not involve mechanical 
misplay shall not be construed as an error,” while Note (2) further explains that, while “it is not 
necessary that the fielder touch the ball to be charged with an error,” the fielder‟s failure to do so 
shall be charged an error only if “in the scorer‟s judgment the fielder could have handled the ball 
with ordinary effort.” 
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can say something stronger than that.  With a little better effort or a greater 
exercise of skill, he could have made an out—as is not true in the cases of non-
success when the fielder could not have done any better.  So we can say, in cases 
like these, not only that the fielder‟s play wasn‟t a success, but that it was a failure 
and thus, in a sense, a mistake.  Yet not all mistakes in baseball are what the sport 
deems an “error.”  
Following the lesson of errors in baseball, we might then distinguish two 
types of errors: blunders and mere mistakes. So insofar as the goal of video replay 
in sports generally, or in football particularly, is to correct officiating errors, that 
statement could describe two different objectives: to correct mistake-errors or to 
correct blunder-errors.  The argument to this point has assumed that the goal is 
mistake-correction.  But perhaps it‟s blunder-correction.  If mistake-correction is 
the goal, then the IVE standard achieves it poorly and should be scrapped for 
something like de novo review.  But perhaps mistake-correction ought not to be 
our ambition.  Perhaps we should aim only to correct blunders-errors, not (mere) 
mistake-errors.  If so, de novo review might seem—at least at first blush—to have 
no advantage over IVE. 
Of course, it remains for defenders of IVE to explain why the goal should 
be blunder-correction and not (mere) error-correction.  In truth, a satisfactory 
answer is not apparent to me.  Nor, however, is it obvious to me that trying to 
develop such an argument is futile.  Therefore, to stimulate further thinking on 
this topic, I‟ll mention two paths down which a proponent of the blunder-
correction construal of the Pinchbeck Principle might wish to travel.  Loosely, the 
first path is an argument from justice, and the second an argument from virtue.  
Insofar as describing these argumentative strategies as “paths” suggests that they 
are alternatives to one another and thus not aggregable, one might prefer to think 
of them as building blocks thus potentially combinable.  Either way, I do not 
claim that justice-based considerations and virtue-based ones exhaust the ways to 
possibly vindicate the blunder-correction principle. 
The argument from justice takes issue with my earlier comments regarding 
the relationship between desert and justice. I have said (a) that competitors 
deserve what their performances warrant as measured against the rules of their 
sport, and (b) that justice consists of giving competitors what they deserve.  A 
justice-based argument for blunder-correction over mistake-correction could 
challenge either of these claims. 
Start with a challenge to proposition (a).  The rules I have in mind are the 
rules that govern play and are addressed to the players, not the rules that govern 
adjudication and are addressed to the officials—the conduct rules” (or “primary 
 
 
 REPLAY (3/7/2011) 41 
rules”), not the “decision rules” (or “secondary rules”).
77
  Here‟s an example that 
will make clearer the distinction I‟m drawing.  Suppose a wide receiver catches a 
pass in bounds for a ten-yard gain.  Suppose also, however, that the officials 
determine, incorrectly but reasonably, that the receiver did not have possession.  I 
have assumed that the offense deserves a first down because it has in fact moved 
the ball ten yards downfield and the rules governing play—the rules addressed to 
the competitors—provide that a ten-yard gain earns a first down.  An alternative 
view would hold that the rules addressed to the officials must be consulted in 
order to determine what the participants deserve.  If players deserve the outcome 
that accords with the instructions given the officials—instructions that are 
sensitive to what the officials believe transpired—then the offense does not 
deserve a first down if what the official is supposed to do given that he believes 
the pass was not cleanly caught is to rule the pass incomplete.  This view strikes 
me as significantly less plausible than the first, but not crazy on its face. 
A somewhat more promising road is to acknowledge that desert is 
measured by the conduct rules, but to deny that justice consists of arranging 
outcomes to accord with desert—it is to accept claim (a), but to challenge claim 
(b).   It does so by exploiting a possible distinction between desert and entitlement 
such that the obligations of officials are taken into account not when determining 
what players deserve but only when determining what they are entitled to.  
Switching sports, suppose that the next pitch on a 3-2 count passes through the 
strike zone and is taken by the batter, but that the umpire mistakenly believes that 
the pitch was high or outside.  On the view that I have favored, the pitcher 
deserves to be credited with a  strikeout.  Very possibly, though, he is not entitled 
to such a call.  If this is right, then the important question becomes whether justice 
in an institutional setting consists of giving participants what they deserve or what 
they are entitled to.  If the latter, then the idea that sports should be concerned 
with blunder-correction and not with mistake-correction might get off the ground 
if players are entitled to blunder-free officiating but not mistake-free officiating.  
Obviously, many dots will have to be connected to make this argument go.  My 
aim now is only to gesture toward a possible argument not to fully sketch it out, 
let alone to defend it. 
The second route or building block might draw from George Will‟s notion 
that an officiating error is not a “blemish to be expunged.” Because mistake-errors 
are ineliminable, the argument might go, the desire to correct them reflects an 
unattractive instinct—perhaps even a vice of some sort.  Somewhat similarly, one 
might worry that a reversal implies that the call being reversed fell short of what 
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 On conduct rules and decision rules, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct 
Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984).  On primary rules 
and secondary rules, see Hart, supra note 7, at 79-91. 
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was reasonably expected of the on-field official, and therefore that reversal 
reinforces a general social tendency for people to develop unrealistic expectations 
of themselves and others, which expectations undermine self-esteem and impede 
formation of rewarding interpersonal relationships.  (A loose analogy might be 
drawn here to the deleterious impact that Barbie Dolls and GI Joes have on body 
image.)  Consequently, resisting the impulse to correct mere mistakes builds 
character.   
Frankly, I find none of this compelling.  To try to correct mistakes that are 
correctible need not, it seems to me, either issue from or reinforce a childish and 
unrealistic belief in the prospects for human perfection.  But others might think 
that these brief and telegraphic thoughts hold greater promise.  Again, my goal 
here is only to gesture toward the sorts of ideas that, if refined and elaborated 
upon, might possibly serve as building blocks in support of the proposition that 
sports leagues should be more concerned with correcting blunder-errors and less 
concerned—or unconcerned—with correcting (mere) mistake errors.  If that 
proposition can be vindicated, it is not hard to imagine the rest of the argument 
that would yield a conclusion in favor of highly deferential review. 
D. Summary 
Readers who had hoped that this Part would reach a confident conclusion 
regarding the single optimal standard of review for the NFL are apt now to be 
disappointed, for I have concluded that there remains room for reasonable 
disagreement regarding critical empirical and evaluative premises.  In fairness, 
though, to have expected much more at this time was unrealistic.  Before 
resolving a problem, you must first get a clear handle on the fruitful ways to think 
about it; you must identify and map out the possibly promising arguments and 
argumentative paths.  When addressing already identified problems in mature 
fields, we find that much of the necessary cartographic work has already been 
accomplished.  Not so in the case of instant replay‟s standard of review, a subject 
on which there is virtually no serious scholarly work. The same observation holds 
true, of course, across wide swaths of the jurisprudence of sport, which is what 
makes it such a promising and exciting field of scholarly inquiry.  
That said, several conclusions appear warranted. 
First, there is a powerful prima facie argument against IVE:  (1) The 
reason to institute instant replay review in the first place is to correct 
(consequential) officiating mistakes. (2) All (final) errors are bad because they fail 
to award competitors the outcome they deserve in virtue of their performance. (3) 
Final errors produced by mistakenly reversing a correct call are not, as a class, 
any worse or better, in the currency of what makes an erroneous call bad, than 
final errors arrived at by mistakenly affirming an incorrect call.  (4) Generally 
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speaking, the reviewing referee, deciding with the benefit of advanced video 
technology, is better able to make the correct call than are the on-field officials 
who have to make an initial call from a single vantage point at game speed.  (5) 
Therefore, de novo review would better serve the value that instant replay is 
designed to serve than does a standard, like IVE, that entrenches initial calls 
against reversal. 
Second, the most-often advanced arguments against a less deferential 
standard of review, like de novo, are unpersuasive: (6) Instant replay can be 
implemented to produce about the same amount of delay regardless of the 
standard of review.  (7) It seems unlikely that a system of de novo review would 
diminish respect for officials any more than IVE does; indeed, the converse 
hypothesis seems at least as likely to be true. 
Third and nonetheless, it would be premature to conclude that a non-
deferential standard of review is optimal, all things considered.  Perhaps the most 
promising route toward vindicating the IVE depends upon demonstrating that, 
after play has already been stopped to permit review, it is worse to reverse an 
initially correct on-field call than to permit to stand an initially incorrect on-field 
call.  This would be consistent with proposition (3) above if the fact of reversal 
were itself a cost.  Although arguments designed to show that “erroneous 
reversals” are worse or more costly than “erroneous affirmances” have not been 
well developed, we have uncovered at least one  possible path toward such a 
conclusion: (8) Regardless of whether it corrects an officiating mistake or creates 
a new one, every reversal conceivably makes sports less entertaining, or reduces 
the pleasure and satisfaction of the spectators, because the transfer of the call 
reduces the utility of the losers more than it increases the utility of the winners, all 
else equal.  Additionally or alternatively, (9) the NFL‟s interest in correcting 
errors might be better conceived as an interest in correcting blunders than mere 
mistakes.  While I am not myself much tempted by propositions (8) or (9), it 
would be premature to dismiss them.  And thinking them through will require 
attention to, among other things: the dual character of  spectator sports as both 
athletic contests and as popular entertainment; tradeoffs between satisfying 
preferences (or increasing welfare) and promoting justice; the constituents of 
desert and entitlement, and the relationship of each to justice and injustice; the 
operation of cognitive biases like loss aversion; the virtues and vices of 
endeavoring to correct human errors that are not also human blunders.  These are 
rich and complex issues, of broad jurisprudential interest. 
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IV. THREE EASY FIXES 
Given the inconclusive conclusion to Part III, the reader would be forgiven 
for thinking that we can say nothing more than: maybe the NFL should keep IVE, 
maybe it should lower the standard to de novo, depending on where you come 
down on the factors that I have agreed to be reasonably disputable.  To the 
contrary, I will argue here that the NFL should change its system no matter 
what—but that different changes would be appropriate on different assumptions. 
A. Proposal 1: Correcting Mistake-Errors 
Persons who believe that the purpose of instituting instant replay should 
be to correct officiating mistakes at acceptable cost will be drawn to a lower 
standard of review that does a better job at mistake-correction.  Probably the most 
obvious upshot of the foregoing analysis is that football‟s indisputable visual 
evidence standard of review should be scrapped and replaced with de novo 
review.
78
 That‟s not a bad idea.  But were the league to embrace de novo review, 
it could implement it in a manner that would promise even greater overall 
accuracy and faster review.   
As the French philosopher the Marquis de Condorcet established over two 
hundred years ago, if individuals are even slightly more likely to answer a given 
question correctly than incorrectly, then increasing the number of decision makers 
and resolving the question by majority vote will increase the likelihood of getting 
the right answer.  Given Condorcet‟s “Jury Theorem,” and indulging the 
uncontroversial assumption that replay officials‟ de novo calls of on-field plays 
are more likely to be right than wrong, then resolving reviewed calls by involving 
some odd number of replay officials greater than one and aggregating their 
judgments will prove more accurate than leaving review in the hands of a single 
official.  
So here‟s a concrete proposal: the NFL should set up a special video 
review operation in a centralized location and staff it with some modest number 
of trained video replay officials.  Whenever a challenge arises, ad hoc panels of, 
say, three or five officials (or whatever number cost considerations permit) would 
be drawn at random from the larger pool to review all the video evidence from the 
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 To reiterate a point made earlier:  de novo review would not render the initial call 
wholly unprivileged.  The on-field would be “sticky” for at least two reasons.  First, the burden of 
persuasion would rest on the challenger, so that if the reviewing official concludes that the initial 
call is as likely to have been right as wrong, the initial call stands.  Second, the reviewing official 
might even take the initial on-field call as evidence in favor of the facts that would support it.  
When the on-field official was in a position to see the play from an angle that the cameras missed, 
the reviewer might reasonably infer the reason the on-field official made the call he did was 
because that‟s how things did in fact appear. 
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several stadium cameras much as the referee does on-site under the present 
system.  Without deliberating, each official would register his own de novo 
judgment regarding what the call should be, and the final call would be whatever 
the majority “vote” established.
79
  Because, in addition to exploiting Condorcet‟s 
insight, this system would also take advantage of the greater expertise of officials 
specially trained in this single task, review should be more accurate as well as 
faster.  And it would protect against a single corrupt referee even better than does 
the IVE. 
B. Proposal 2: Correcting Blunder-Errors 
The first proposal assumed that the goal of instant replay is to improve 
accuracy or, synonymously, to correct mistake-errors.  Persons who conclude that 
the league should strive only to correct blunder-errors are right to disfavor de 
novo review.  But here‟s the interesting thing: the IVE standard still wouldn‟t be 
sensible—not because it‟s too deferential to the initial call, but because it‟s not 
deferential enough!  Because we can reasonably expect officials to be only as 
good as the visual apparatus with which nature has equipped them (subject to 
modest enhancement, where necessary), after-the-fact high definition, super slo-
mo, multi-angle replay can disclose that the decision was indisputably 
substantively mistaken, even when the on-field official didn‟t blunder.   
To appreciate how this could be let‟s take a second and even more famous 
balletic reception by the Steelers‟ Santonio Holmes: his fully-extended grab of 
Roethlisberger‟s high dart in the rear corner of the end zone to defeat the Arizona 
Cardinals in Super Bowl XLIII.  As the nearly 100 million Americans who 
watched the contest know, although it appeared, both live and on replays, that the 
toes of Holmes‟s right foot did touch the ground after he secured possession of the 
football, the video evidence remains something short of conclusive.  Suppose now 
that NBC had used better video technology and that this improved system 
revealed—indisputably!—that Holmes‟s toe had lifted off the turf just a fraction 
of an inch before he secured possession of the football.
80
  In that event, we‟d 
know that the call on the field was mistaken.  But it still wouldn‟t have been an 
error:  Given the speed of the play, we could not reasonably have expected the 
official to have gotten it right; he is not fairly criticized for having gotten it 
wrong.   
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 Supermajority voting rules could be used instead, though this would yield more final 
errors than would a bare majority rule.  A compromise would be to constitute reviewing panels 
with an even number of members and uphold the initial call if the panel is equally divided. 
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 One commentator has claimed that the video technology “used at the Beijing Olympics 
. . . blows away anything in use in the NFL.”  Paula Duffy, Santonio Holmes Catch Still Under 
Review, Examiner.com, Feb. 4, 2009, available at http://www.examiner.com/x-426-Sports-
Examiner~y2009m2d4-Santonio-Holmes-catch-still-under-review.  
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If the purpose of review were reconceptualized as blunder-correction not 
mistake-correction, it would remain to determine what standard of review should 
be applied to determine whether the call was an error in this more limited sense—
a decision that an official exercising ordinary (professional) perception and 
judgment, having assumed his proper place on the field of play, would not have 
made.  I have no strong views on this score.  Perhaps it would be enough to 
instruct the reviewing referee to overturn what Little League Baseball calls 
“obvious wrongs”—obvious to spectators in real time, and not just obvious on 
review.  Perhaps this is also what Australian cricket captain Ricky Ponting was 
thinking when observing, after instant replay was introduced to test cricket just 
this past year, that “we shouldn't expect every decision to be perfect. What we're 
after is to eradicate the really bad decisions.”
81
   
Whatever the exact reviewing standard might be, the critical insight is that 
if our goal is to correct “really bad decisions”—what I am calling blunder-errors 
in contradistinction to mistake-errors—then the use of multiple-angle super slo-
mo high definition video in replay might be fundamentally misguided.  Think 
about more notorious officiating blunders: Vinnie Testaverde‟s phantom 
touchdown against the Seahawks, or baseball umpire Phil Cuzzi‟s bizarre foul call 
on Joe Mauer‟s opposite-field fly in the 2009 American League Playoffs.  What 
make calls like these “really bad decisions” is that their wrongness is evident even 
to the naked eye.  If the NFL‟s goal should be, not to make sure that the call was 
right, but only that it wasn‟t a blunder, review should be quicker and more 
perfunctory.   
C. Proposal 3: That‟s Entertainment 
A third perspective takes very seriously the idea that partisans who lose 
when a call is reversed feel the sting more sharply than the partisans who gain 
from the reversal enjoy the windfall.  Some advocates of this entertainment-
oriented perspective might think the disparity is so great as to make the use of 
instant replay a bad buy overall.  Others accept instant replay so long as the 
losers‟ sense of loss and aggrievedness can be reduced within acceptable bounds.  
A highly deferential standard of review serves this interest by prohibiting reversal 
except in those circumstances in which even the partisans (fans and players) who 
lose from reversal can be expected to agree that the initial call was mistaken.
82
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 Graeme Smith says Test cricket referral system is half-hearted, THE AUSTRALIAN, Mar. 
3, 2009, available at http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25132162-
5001505,00.html.  
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 Readers who would defend the IVE might nonetheless enjoy this chestnut.  Although 
the NFL rules rarely specify the standard of proof required for an on-field call, they sometimes do.  
For example, they specify a standard for receptions: if there is any doubt that the receiver made a 
valid reception, the pass must be ruled incomplete. NFL Rule 8, Sec. 1, Art. 6. So we can combine 
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That, I suspect, is the best rationale for IVE.  However even if IVE ought to be 
preserved for this reason (or for others), three modest changes would reduce the 
injustice that such a demanding standard tolerates relative to a less deferential 
standard. 
First, a team that succeeds on its challenges should get an additional 
challenge until it fails.  Under existing rules, a team is allowed a third challenge if 
its first two succeed, but gets no more even if the third succeeds too.  This rule is 
hard to justify.  A challenge succeeds under IVE only if the referee has concluded 
that the call was indisputably mistaken.  If a team has earned three reversals, the 
officials have made at least three indisputably wrong calls to that team‟s 
detriment.  It seems unfair that the fact that the officiating crew had already erred 
so much should serve to render a team unprotected against a subsequent 
officiating blunder.  Compare: voir dire rules do not limit a party‟s challenges for 
cause.  That the defendant has already successfully challenged three members of 
the jury panel who were related to the plaintiff is no reason to bar her from 
successfully challenging the plaintiff‟s brother too. 
In theory, this change could increase delay, though the actual impact 
would be trivial. A variant that probably would have a more than de minimis 
effect on replay-related delay would be to restore a challenge when it succeeds.  
That is, each coach could be granted, not two opportunities to challenge a call, but 
two failed challenges. This, as I say, probably would increase delays.  But it 
wouldn‟t increase net delay if paired with another reform that deserves serious 
attention on its own: eliminate booth review in the final two minutes of each half.  
As Tony Dungy has recognized,
83
 booth reviews slow the game at its most 
exciting juncture yet catch, and thus reverse, indisputably incorrect calls at a 
much lower rate than do coaches‟ challenges.
84
  The NFL could speed up the 
game by placing all power to initiate review in the coaches‟ hands, while 
mitigating the impact on a coach by allowing him to challenge as many calls as 
he‟d like until he fails twice or runs out of timeouts.  
                                                                                                                                                              
that standard of proof with the indisputable-visual-evidence standard of review to produce a nice 
question:  if the ruling on the field is “complete,” what must the replay official determine in order 
to overrule that call: (a) that there is indisputable visual evidence that the pass was incomplete, or 
(b) that there is indisputable visual evidence that it is not certain that the pass was 
complete?  Imagine, for instance, that the camera shows only the back of the receiver as he goes 
out of bounds and it is impossible to tell from that angle whether he had full possession of the ball 
before he left the field of play, and that the official who called the pass complete was standing 
next to the camera, making it (arguably) indisputable that he could not have discerned with 
certainty that the pass was complete.  What is the correct call on review? 
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 See John Clayton, Dungy Wants Changes to Replay System, ESPN, Dec. 15, 2002, 
available at http://a.espncdn.com/nfl/columns/clayton_john/1476343.html.  
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 See supra note 40.  
 
 
 REPLAY (3/7/2011) 48 
Third and most radically, the NFL should explore the possibility of 
delimiting circumstances in which instant replay could be used to determine the 
initial call, and not just to review a call already made. The strongest case for use 
of replay to make the first call is on “pivotal” or “outcome-affecting” plays when 
the on-field officials are not confident of the correct call.  Consider a pass to the 
end zone in the final two minutes of a close game in which, even after 
deliberation, the officials are uncertain whether the receiver secured possession in 
bounds. Sure, we‟d prefer them to be confident, but they just might not be.  One 
thing the referee can be confident of, though, is that whatever call he makes will 
be reviewed—either at the instigation of the replay official or (if booth reviews 
are eliminated) by the disappointed coach.  Under such circumstances—and I do 
not think they are terribly rare—IVE seems to work particular unfairness.  There 
is no good reason to forcefully entrench an initial and plainly consequential call 
that the on-field officials know is little more than guesswork.  Rugby league and 
rugby union both allow match officials to defer a call on tries (scoring chances) to 
the replay official.
85
   In short, instant replay could be used not only to review on-
field calls but also—if very occasionally—to make calls in the first instance.  
When used in this latter manner, review must, of course, be non-deferential, and 
the reviewing official can be freed to reach the decision most likely to be 
accurate.  That‟s an alternative well worth considering by any system of instant 
replay that otherwise employs a highly deferential standard of review.  
 
V. YES, NO, AND MAYBE: THE THREE-VERDICT SYSTEM 
A. Instant replay in the NCAA 
The NFL had experimented with video replay as early as 1986 and the 
system in place today dates, with revisions, back to 1999.  College football, 
however, did not enter the replay age until the Big Ten deployed it on a trial basis 
in 2004.  Most major conferences followed the next year and, in 2006, the NCAA 
enacted rules governing the use of video replay to review on-field calls.  The 
individual conferences decide whether to use video replay but, if they choose to, 
they must abide by the NCAA rules. 
The NCAA and NFL systems differ in detail.  For example, while each 
coach is entitled to one challenge per game (a second if the first is successful), 
review in the NCAA is ordinarily initiated by a designated replay official.  Also, 
not all the calls reviewable in the NFL are also reviewable in college football.  For 
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the most part, though, the NCAA replay rules track their NFL counterparts.  For 
purposes of this chapter, it is enough to note one fundamental similarity and one 
intriguing difference. 
The core similarity is that the NCAA essentially parrots the NFL standard 
of review, directing that “to reverse an on-field ruling, the replay official must be 
convinced beyond all doubt by indisputable visual evidence through one or more 
video replays provided to the monitor.”
86
 Moreover, while the NCAA has recently 
reiterated its commitment to this standard, it has done no better than its 
professional counterparts in providing a persuasive rationale.
87
  In short, the 
NCAA sits pretty much where the NFL does: with an extraordinarily demanding 
standard of review and no clear articulation of the considerations or values that 
might support it—which is to say, no good reasons why, once video replay has 
been instituted, we should design it to ensure that so many wrong calls will be 
allowed to stand.  Indeed, that the NCAA could plausibly invoke any such reasons 
is marginally less likely than for its professional cousin.  We saw that one 
possible (if not especially convincing) rationale for the indisputable video 
evidence standard in the NFL is to reduce delay, mostly by discouraging head 
coaches from challenging calls in the first place.  But that rationale isn‟t available 
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 Rule 7, section 7.  I do not know why it substitutes “video” for “visual.” 
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 In 2009 the rules committee inserted a new statement of “philosophy” to the replay 
rules.  Codified at section 1 of Rule 12, this statement provides:  
The instant replay process operates under the fundamental assumption that the 
ruling on the field is correct.  The replay official may reverse a ruling if and only if the 
video evidence convinces him beyond all doubt that the ruling was incorrect.  Without 
such indisputable video evidence, the replay official must allow the ruling to stand. 
 Notice to start that the second and third sentences are simply directives—indeed, they 
aren‟t even two different directives but merely rephrasings of the very same one.  So if the 
statement contains any defense of the standard it‟s in the first sentence.  No doubt the rules 
committee is fully warranted in assuming that the ruling on the field is correct.  Without any such 
assumption, it might be hard to explain why the game is not stopped to permit careful review of 
each play as a matter of course. That would be folly.  So although “the replay official and his crew 
shall review every play of a game,” he is sensibly instructed not to stop the game unless he 
believes “that there is reasonable evidence to believe an error was made in the initial on-field 
ruling” (and then only if he believes that “the outcome of a review would have a direct, 
competitive impact on the game”).  But assumptions aren‟t the conclusions to rigorous argument 
or searching inquiry.  They‟re starting points.  As such, they are frequently mistaken—more often 
(we hope) right, but often enough wrong.   If the video evidence leaves the replay official with a 
high degree of confidence—albeit short of certainty—that the on-field ruling was incorrect, then 
the natural thing to say is that the assumption is defeated or overcome.  After all, that assumptions 
can be overcome is part of their nature as starting points for argument or action, and not as axioms 
or postulates.  So the committee‟s statement of philosophy doesn‟t explain what allows us to travel 
from the entirely reasonable “fundamental assumption that the ruling on the field is correct” to the 
directive that it must be upheld when evidence strongly suggests, but does not conclusively 
establish, that, in this particular case, it wasn‟t. 
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to the NCAA, where review is ordinarily initiated at the discretion of the replay 
official himself who may stop the game to review an unlimited number of calls 
and who suffers under no time limits when he does initiate a review.
88
  
So much for fundamental similarity. Now for the intriguing difference.  
The Official NFL Rules specify how certain the replay official must be before 
reversing an on-field call.  But they don‟t dictate precisely what he must say.  The 
NCAA does.  If the official is sufficiently convinced (that is, convinced beyond 
all doubt by indisputable visual evidence) that the on-field ruling was erroneous, 
he must reverse the call.  In doing so, he must announce what the new ruling is 
and specify what consequences follow.  That‟s all straightforward enough.  But 
what if the official is not convinced that the initial ruling was wrong?  The 
rulebook recognizes two possibilities: 
“1. If the video evidence confirms the on-field ruling,” then the 
official is directed to announce: “After further review, the ruling on the 
field is confirmed.”    
“2. If there is no indisputable (conclusive) evidence to reverse the 
on-field ruling,” the official must announce: “After further view, the ruling 
on the field stands.” 
Here, finally, is the point of interest.  The two announcements—I will call 
them two different “verdicts”—have the same concrete consequence.  Whether 
the replay official is persuaded that the on-field ruling was correct or merely not 
persuaded beyond all doubt that it was wrong, the on-field ruling stands.
89
  So 
why bother to distinguish the two cases?  Why isn‟t it enough just to announce 
either that the call stands or that it is reversed? 
I don‟t present this question as a “puzzle.”  That‟s because the answer 
seems fairly obvious.  Although the first verdict—that the ruling “is confirmed”—
and the second—that it (merely) “stands”—have the same tangible effects, they 
plainly differ in what we might term “expressive significance.”  The stoppage of 
play and initiation of formal review broadcast doubt about the on-field official‟s 
decision.  The first ruling announces to the multitude:  “he got it right”; the 
second says only “well, I can‟t say that he got it wrong.”  Verdict (2), to be sure, 
releases the referee from liability. But verdict (1) does more: it releases him from 
liability and vindicates him as well. 
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Now, we shouldn‟t overdramatize. The officials sometimes get it wrong.  
They know it, we know it, and they know that we know it.  They strive to do the 
best they can (and it‟s a tribute to their ability and training that they get the close 
calls right as often as they do), but they know that the best they can do is still well 
short of perfection.  So I don‟t imagine that the prospect of receiving something 
less than explicit and unequivocal public recognition that he made the right call 
causes the ordinary official much anxiety—even if, in a different cultural context, 
things could be very different.  (It might be different in sumo, for example.  To 
this day, the ring referee, the gyoji, carries a dagger as a symbol of his authority.  
Centuries ago, the dagger served a more practical function: a gyoji who erred was 
expected to disembowel himself.)
90
 
Still that extra public affirmation (“he got it right”) isn‟t nothing—it isn‟t 
nothing for the official himself and it isn‟t nothing for the entity that employs and 
trains him.  At least that‟s what one might reasonably have surmised in the 
absence of evidence one way or another. However, the very existence of the 
NCAA three-verdict system—(1) confirmed, (2) stands, and (3) reversed—is 
powerful supporting evidence.  That the NCAA bothers to instruct its replay 
officials to distinguish between two judgments even when, in one sense, the 
difference doesn‟t matter, tells us that, in another sense, it must. 
Turns out that it matters in the NFL too.  Although the official rulebook 
itself doesn‟t distinguish between the two types of affirmance, actual practice on 
the pro level has in recent years started to track the collegiate example.  
Sometimes when affirming the on-field call, the referee will specify in some 
detail just what the video reveals.  Other times, he will favor the audience only 
with the terse “after further review, the ruling on the field stands.”  It stands, but it 
isn‟t confirmed—a distinction that several broadcast announcers have increasingly 
emphasized.
91
   
B. From the Gridiron to the Courtroom 
Much of this essay has been designed to show that tools and analysis 
developed in the law can be of help to sports leagues by helping them to more 
sensitively evaluate the costs and benefits of different systems of instant replay 
review.  Now I want to argue that football can return the favor.  For a moment‟s 
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reflection should reveal that a system of three rather than two verdicts has no 
particular or unique linkage to instant replay or to football or to sports more 
generally.  To the contrary, a three-verdict system is at least an option anytime a 
decision procedure employs a standard of proof (or of review) more demanding 
than the default more-likely-than-not standard.
92
  And the longest standing, most 
widespread, and most familiar such decision procedure is found, not in football, 
but in law.  It is criminal law‟s “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof.  
As we have seen, that standard requires that if the jury is persuaded of the 
defendant‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, they must convict.  If the jury is not 
so persuaded, they must acquit, and the state may not retry the defendant on the 
same charges.  In the latter case, the formal verdict is “not guilty.”  But that‟s a 
famous misnomer.  It does not mean “We believe that the defendant is not guilty” 
but rather “We believe that the state has failed to prove the defendant‟s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
Here, then, is the question:  Why just two verdicts?  Why not three?  If we 
think it‟s desirable to distinguish the two different bases for affirming an official‟s 
call in football, why isn‟t it also desirable to distinguish the two different bases 
for acquitting a defendant in a criminal trial?  The state could permit (or require) 
the jury to select between two different forms of acquittal: “not guilty” (or 
“innocent”) when they are persuaded that the defendant is not, in fact, guilty; and 
“not proven guilty” when they believe that the defendant is guilty more likely 
than not, but are left with too much doubt to convict.  Why shouldn‟t we? 
Many readers, I suspect, will have the immediate intuitive reaction that the 
football case and the criminal case are really quite different, that although a three-
verdict review system makes good sense when instant replay is involved, we are 
better off with the existing two-verdict system in criminal law.  That could be the 
right answer.  But we‟d do well not to invest too much confidence in that initial 
intuition or reaction, even if strongly felt.  One of the most stable and robust 
findings in social science concerns what psychologists and economists call the 
status quo bias: a cognitive bias that disposes us to prefer the way things are, and 
to assume more strongly than the evidence would justify that the way things are is 
supported by sound reason.  So you might be drawn to the two-verdict system 
because there are good reasons for it, or you might be drawn to it because that‟s 
the way things are.
93
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Well, that‟s not the way things are everywhere.  Not in Scotland, for 
example.   Although part of the United Kingdom, Scots law is its own legal 
system, tracing back to Roman law and today containing elements of English 
common law and the continental civil law tradition.  Among the more distinctive 
features of Scottish criminal law is the availability of three verdicts.  As in 
English criminal law, Scottish judges and juries are required to convict a 
defendant if persuaded of his guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  In that case, the 
verdict is “guilty.”  But if not so persuaded, the factfinder must return either one 
of two verdicts:  “not guilty” or “not proven.”  Orthodox understanding has it that 
the former expresses a judgment “that the accused definitely did not commit the 
crime with which he is charged,” whereas the latter “means merely that the judge 
or jury has reasonable doubt as to the accused‟s guilt.”
94
  So instead of blithely 
accepting that American criminal law is as it ought to be, it‟s well worth trying 
carefully to identify, and evaluate, the costs and benefits of introducing a third 
verdict.
95
 
1. Expressive winners and losers.  For ease of discussion, let‟s agree on 
some terms.  Under either system, a jury would be instructed to return a verdict of 
“guilty”—that is, to convict—whenever persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt of 
the defendant‟s guilt.  The present verdict that encompasses all acquittals, not 
distinguishing among them, is, as we know, “not guilty.”  Let‟s hypothesize a new 
acquittal of “innocent” for cases when the factfinder believes that, more likely 
than not, the accused is innocent of the charges;
96
 and a new acquittal of “not 
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proven” when the factfinder believes it more likely that the accused is guilty, but 
has “reasonable doubts” that preclude conviction.
97
 (See Table)  
 
 
Confidence in Guilt 2-verdict system 3-verdict system Consequence 
Guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt 
Guilty Guilty Convicted 
More likely than not 
Guilty, but not 
beyond a reasonable 
doubt 
 
 
Not Guilty 
 
Not proven 
 
Acquitted 
More likely than not 
Innocent 
Innocent Acquitted 
 
One might suppose at first blush that a choice between the two systems 
would not affect the conviction rate.  So long as the standard of proof that the 
state must satisfy to win a conviction remains unchanged, then the same 
defendants destined to be convicted under a two-verdict system should be 
convicted under a three-verdict system, and vice versa.  The only defendants who 
would be affected by a choice between the systems would be those who are 
acquitted.  (These are the folks who find themselves in the shaded boxes in 
Table.)  And it should be clear which of those defendants win and which lose.  
Those defendants who are awarded the new more favorable “innocent” acquittal 
would be winners: the verdict of “innocence” signals the jurors‟ belief that the 
defendant was more likely than not innocent, a message that the jurors would 
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have been unable to communicate in the two-verdict system.  Those acquitted 
defendants who are adjudged “not proven” would be losers, for onlookers will 
know that these defendants could have been granted the more desirable 
“innocent” acquittal, and weren‟t.  
Presumably, the losers will outnumber the winners.  (There will be more 
individuals in the “Not proven” cell than in the “Innocent” cell.)  Nobody finds 
himself in the dock unless several actors in the system, each of whom could have 
done otherwise, elected to proceed: the police might not have arrested him, the 
prosecutor might have chosen not to charge him, a grand jury might have refused 
to indict.  Admittedly, these aren‟t all the most robust protections: defense 
attorneys quip that a grand jury will indict a ham sandwich.  But they probably do 
serve to ensure that there‟s a genuine case against the overwhelming majority of 
defendants who reach trial.  And trial outcomes seem to bear this out: the 
conviction rate across American jurisdictions—putting plea bargains entirely to 
the side—hovers around 80% in state cases and 90% in federal prosecutions.
98
 
Given the several veto gates through which a criminal defendant must pass before 
reaching a jury, it seems doubtful that the majority of jurors who do vote to acquit 
believe, not merely that there remains reasonable doubt of the accused‟s guilt, but 
that he is more likely than not to be innocent.   If we‟re just counting noses, the 
status quo might appear preferable. 
But should we just count noses?  We should if the magnitudes of the gains 
and losses are equal, if what each loser loses is as great as what each winner wins.  
In fact, though, that assumption seems highly improbable.  As one scholar has 
wryly observed: “For an innocent suspect charged with a crime, there are only 
two possible outcomes: bad and really bad.”
99
  The better outcome—acquittal—is 
still bad because of the burdens and anxiety of mounting a defense to criminal 
prosecution and also because of the reality that acquittals rarely erase all doubts 
about the defendant‟s innocence that the facts of arrest and prosecution raise.  
You might be acquitted, but don‟t expect all your coworkers, distant relatives, and 
former high school classmates no longer to suspect that you‟re guilty.  To be sure, 
even the more robust acquittal associated with a verdict of innocence would not 
eliminate all skepticism.  But it should go a long way.  This is an invaluable 
benefit to those who secure it.  And not only to them: on the assumption that more 
information is generally better than less, because a two-tiered acquittal system 
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conveys more nuanced information than does the current single-tier system, 
society at large benefits as well. 
 Importantly, the very thing that renders the award of an innocent verdict 
so valuable to those who receive it—the fact that, under the present two-verdict 
system, so many observers  think that acquitted defendants are probably guilty—
also reduces the sting of a “not proven” verdict.  Sure, defendants who get only 
the “not proven” acquittal in a three-verdict system are likely to be thought guilty 
by many.  But the same is true if they had been acquitted as “not guilty” under a 
two-verdict system.  In short, the gain to each of the (relatively fewer) winners is 
likely to be considerably greater than the loss to each of the (relatively more 
numerous) losers.  Therefore, the aggregate gain might well outweigh the 
aggregate loss.  Besides, the fact that the intermediate verdict in a three-verdict 
system has somewhat more sting than acquittal in a two-verdict system isn‟t all 
bad.  Most of the folks awarded a “not proven” acquittal would in fact be guilty, 
so perhaps fully deserve a little stigma even if we demand greater confidence to 
formally convict and to punish.
100
   
That last suggestion will strike some readers as harsh, and inconsistent 
with the  presumption of innocence.  Harsh, maybe.  But not, I think, contrary to 
our vaunted presumption.  The simple fact is that the presumption of innocence, 
though familiar and high-sounding, does not alone mean terribly much.
101
  All it 
does is assign the burden of proof to the prosecution.  It doesn‟t even say anything 
about what the standard of proof must be.  Permitting convictions so long as the 
state proves the defendant‟s guilt “more likely than not” is fully consistent with 
the presumption of innocence.  To be sure, such a practice would not be consistent 
with the common law tradition, nor is it constitutionally permissible given 
Supreme Court precedent.  But it‟s not the presumption of innocence that rules 
this out, it‟s the understanding that due process precludes conviction unless the 
state proves each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  So I‟m going 
to revise what I said above.  What the presumption of innocence adds to the legal 
rule that the prosecution must prove each element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt is almost nothing.  All it does—and it may not even be needed 
for this—is to make clear that the evidence on which the prosecution may rely is 
limited to what it brings forth during the criminal trial: the fact finder may not 
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speed the prosecution along, as it were, by treating the fact of the indictment itself 
as some evidence of the defendant‟s guilt.   
The Scottish rule precludes conviction unless the prosecution proves all 
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  It is therefore consistent with 
the presumption of innocence.  Now, you might say that it is inconsistent with the 
spirit of the presumption—or, better, with the spirit of the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard of proof—to allow adverse consequences short of conviction to 
attach unless the evidence supports a conviction.  But that‟s not 
plausible.  Consider that criminal defendants can be held without bail.  That one 
fact alone demonstrates the falsity of the bromide that “it is a cornerstone of our 
system that defendant is considered innocent until proven guilty.”  Surely it 
wouldn‟t be kosher to lock up folks we consider innocent.  Rather, it is a 
cornerstone of our system that nobody be convicted of a crime and subject to 
criminal punishment unless the state proves his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  We can‟t get more from the presumption of innocence, and a three-verdict 
system doesn‟t run afoul of this essential precept. 
The value of a more fully exculpatory acquittal is recognized by the State 
of California, which has for three decades permitted an acquitted defendant to 
petition the court for a declaration of factual innocence.
102
  Now, California‟s 
system is not well designed.  For one thing, the burden imposed on the 
defendant—to establish that “no reasonable cause exists to believe” that he 
committed the charged offense—is far too demanding.
103
  Furthermore, because 
the state does not provide counsel for pursuing a post-acquittal innocence petition, 
and because few most criminal defendants have the personal resources to invest 
on such a low-probability chance, few acquitted defendants even make the 
attempt.
104
  Nonetheless, the instinct is sound: there are innocent acquitted 
defendants, and the benefit to them of being exonerated, not merely exculpated, is 
immeasurable. 
To say that it‟s immeasurable does not mean, moreover, that it is entirely 
intangible.  The police maintain arrest records even when the arrest results in the 
dismissal of charges or an acquittal at trial.  So a defendant acquitted by the 
customary “not guilty” verdict is still more likely to be suspected and arrested for 
a new offense that strikes the police as similar to the old one.  And an arrest can 
be grounds in some states for revocation of probation or parole even when it 
results in acquittal so long as the officer at the revocation hearing believes that the 
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probationer or parolee was probably guilty.  Presumably, defendants acquitted as 
“innocent” would be relieved of these burdens.
105
   
2. Total convictions.  So far we have supposed that the choice between the 
two systems would have no effect on the conviction rate: a defendant destined for 
conviction under the existing two-verdict system would be convicted under a 
three-verdict system, and vice versa.  But that is almost certainly incorrect.  Some 
number of defendants who are adjudged “guilty” under the two-verdict system 
would be adjudged “not proven” under a three-verdict system. 
This is admittedly counterintuitive.  But the claim rests on a well 
established psychological bias known as “the framing effect”—the phenomenon 
in which two “logically equivalent (but not transparently equivalent) statements 
of a problem lead decision makers to choose different options.”
106
  In a standard 
example, physicians and public health officials evaluate some policy option—say, 
a quarantine or compulsory vaccination—differently depending on whether they 
are told the percentage of lives that the measure will save or the percentage of 
expected deaths that it will fail to avoid, even when these amount to the same 
thing. 
One subtype of the framing effect is “the compromise effect,” the 
tendency of people to evaluate a given option more favorably when it appears as 
intermediate in a choice set rather than as an extreme.  In one particularly relevant 
set of experiments,
107
 a summary of facts concerning a homicide was presented to 
two groups of subjects.  Subjects in the first group were asked to decide whether 
the defendant‟s actions satisfied the legal definition of manslaughter (punishable 
by eight years imprisonment) or of murder (punishable up to life imprisonment 
with the possibility of parole).  Subjects in the second group were offered, in 
addition, a third possibility of aggravated murder (punishable by death or life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole).   
Forty seven percent of the subjects in the first group (the two-option 
group) chose manslaughter, while 53% chose murder.  But for compromise 
effects, we would expect that the percentage of subjects choosing manslaughter in 
the second group (the three-option group) would remain about the same: as a 
logical matter, if the defendant should be found guilty only of manslaughter when 
the alternative is murder, he should still be convictable only of manslaughter 
when an additional more extreme form of murder is put on the table.  As it 
happened, though, only 19% of the subjects in the second group chose 
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manslaughter, the remaining 81% dividing about equally between murder and 
aggravated murder.  This is the compromise effect—also known as extremeness 
aversion—in action: murder suddenly became a more attractive option just 
because it became outflanked.  Implications for a 3-verdict option are clear: some 
juries that would have convicted a defendant when given a choice between two 
“extremes” will acquit on the grounds of “not proven” when that is the 
intermediate option.  Three days before the Saints would meet the Colts in Super 
Bowl XLIV, Freddie Peacock became the 250
th
 person whose wrongful 
conviction was set aside on the strength of exculpatory DNA evidence.
108
  
Possibly some number of those innocent men and women would not have been 
convicted in the first place had their juries been given the option of a third verdict.  
3. Scots on the rocks.  In fact, the belief that the availability of a more 
favorable acquittal affects the line between the less favorable acquittal and 
conviction was at the root of Scottish disaffection with their three-verdict system 
in the early 1990s when juries in three high-profile murder prosecutions returned 
not-proven verdicts despite what most observers deemed evidence of guilt fully 
adequate to support conviction—including, in one case, the defendant‟s teeth 
marks on the victim‟s body.
109
  In the end, the reform was resisted, but without 
much enthusiasm.  Even Lord Advocate McCluskey, who defended the existing 
system, acknowledged that one wouldn‟t sensibly incorporate two levels of 
acquittal were one “starting from scratch.”
110
  But, charmingly illustrating the 
status quo bias, he opined that that was little reason to actually change things.  
The Scots were probably right to suppose that eliminating their top-drawer 
acquittal and switching to a two-verdict system would result in more convictions.  
Yet the extent of their dissatisfaction with their existing criminal justice regime 
has much more to do, not with a two-tiered acquittal system per se, but with the 
simply nutty way they have implemented it.  Judges instruct juries that there are 
three verdicts, and that they may not return a verdict of guilty unless persuaded of 
the defendant‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  But they don‟t instruct juries 
regarding how to choose between a verdict of “not guilty” and one of “not 
proven.”  This is not a mere oversight.  Inexplicably, it seems designed.  In one 
case, an appeals court specifically instructed trial judges not to explain the 
                                                          
108
 See Innocence Project, Special Report: 250 Exonerated (Feb. 4, 2010). 
109
 See Duff, supra note 93; BBC Documentary. 
110
 Duff, The Not Proven Verdict: Jury Mythology and “Moral Panics,” at 8; Sally 
Broadbridge, The “Not Proven” Verdict in Scotland, Standard Note SN/HA/2710, House of 
Commons Library, 1, 8 (May 15, 2009). 
 
 
 REPLAY (3/7/2011) 60 
difference between the two verdicts.
111
  Jurors need not even be instructed that a 
not proven verdict is a verdict of acquittal!
112
   
That neither judges nor jurors have much idea what the verdicts mean is 
evidenced by the shockingly high rate of not guilty acquittals.  We have already 
noted the reason to expect not proven acquittals to outpace not guilty acquittals: 
criminal defendants are not randomly plucked from the population; in any 
minimally decent system of criminal justice, guilty defendants will greatly 
outnumber innocent ones.  Remarkably, however, four-fifths of acquittals in 
bench trials, and two-thirds of the acquittals in jury trials, are of the “not guilty” 
variety.
113
  The Lord Advocate, then, was right: you surely wouldn‟t adopt the 
Scottish three-verdict system were you starting from scratch.  That doesn‟t mean, 
though, that you shouldn‟t adopt a more defensible form of two-tiered acquittals.  
In any event, and putting aside the defects of the Scots‟ peculiar take on a 
two-acquittal system, I have agreed that more defendants are likely to be acquitted 
even in a well-designed two-acquittal system than in a single-acquittal system.  Of 
course, whether that would be a good thing or a bad thing is debatable.  But if we 
really believe that it is far worse for an innocent person to be convicted than for a 
guilty person to go free, and if we also believe that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard, when complied with, promotes the right balance between erroneous 
convictions and erroneous acquittals, then we should be concerned by the 
(unsurprising) experimental finding that jurors do not adhere to the standard.   
Given all this, that a three-verdict system should marginally increase the number 
of acquittals weighs more plausibly in its favor than against it. 
C. Summary 
The previous parts of this essay used concepts and analyses familiar from 
the legal scholar‟s toolkit to destabilize widespread acceptance of the IVE 
standard employed in the NFL and the NCAA.  This Part has turned the tables, 
seeking to demonstrate that practices in football provide reason to question the 
two-verdict (or one-acquittal) system employed throughout Anglo-American 
criminal law.  To be sure, we haven‟t said nearly enough yet to justify confidence 
that substantial reform of the two-verdict system would be desirable.
114
  I hope 
only that we have said enough to take the question seriously. 
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CONCLUSION 
Many sports already use instant replay in limited contexts to review calls 
made by on-field officials.  Given recent and rapid improvements in instant replay 
technology, and the prospect of more to come, its use is bound to grow.  Of 
course, a sports league or regulating body contemplating the use of instant replay 
does not confront a binary question—to employ it or not—but must rather address 
a large number of questions concerning system design.  One prominent question 
concerns the appropriate standard of review.  On this issue, observers and sports 
officials appear to be in widespread agreement: initial calls should be strongly 
entrenched against reversal.  The “indisputable visual evidence” (IVE) standard 
used in American football is widely thought to be a successful model, suitable for 
adaptation elsewhere. 
The near-consensus in favor of highly deferential standards of review for 
instant replay in sports is puzzling, however, for there is obvious reason to prefer 
a more neutral standard.  Very simply, the ostensible purpose for instituting 
instant replay is to correct officiating mistakes and a less deferential standard 
would almost certainly achieve that goal better given today‟s technology.  That is 
not enough to conclude that highly deferential standards are misguided all things 
considered, for other considerations might well support such standards despite 
their failure to minimize officiating errors.  But it is very far from self-evident just 
what those other considerations would be, and this essay has argued that the 
reasons most commonly given for IVE in professional football—that a less 
deferential standard that would do a better job of error-correction would create 
excessive delay or undermine respect for the officials—are unpersuasive. 
While criticizing the standard arguments for IVE, the essay has also 
distilled from loose and telegraphic observations in the sparse existing literature 
other potentially more promising routes toward an ultimately persuasive defense.  
In a nutshell, the most promising argument for highly deferential review might 
well depend upon the proposition that, once a call has been reviewed, a decision 
to reverse what was initially correct is worse than a decision to uphold 
(equivalently, a decision not to reverse) what was initially incorrect.  Indeed, I 
suspect that an implicit belief in the truth of this proposition motivates many 
defenders of a highly deferential standard.  As best I can tell, though, no good 
arguments for this proposition have yet been developed.  One important 
contribution of this essay is to highlight this claim and to sketch a superficially 
plausible path toward vindicating it—a path that invokes the entertainment value 
of sports and likely depends upon claims that reversal and affirmance 
differentially impact aggregate preference-satisfaction.  An alternative route 
toward IVE rests upon a distinction between different types of errors—what I 
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have called “blunder-errors” and “mistake-errors”—married to a claim that, 
insofar as a given sport should be interested in correcting errors, it should be 
interested in correcting the former and not the latter. 
As these last comments indicate, it is not this essay‟s aim to conclusively 
resolve what is the optimal standard of review for the use of instant replay in the 
NFL, let alone what is the optimal standard for sports generally.  Serious and 
careful thinking about the problem is at far too early a stage to make such an 
ambition realistic.  Rather, my goal has been to identify a largely ignored and 
surprisingly challenging puzzle regarding the rules and practices of sports and to 
start charting some paths toward its resolution.  In so doing, I also hope to 
demonstrate that legal scholars have much to teach, and much to learn, by taking 
sports seriously—not as objects of regulation by law, but as legal systems in their 
own right and thus as proper subjects for comparative and jurisprudential inquiry. 
